Illinois Political Science Review

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Editors: Teri J. Bengtson, Elmhurst College
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CONTENTS

From the Editors:

It is with great satisfaction that we release this Spring 2009 volume of the Illinois Political Science Review. This second volume under our editorship presented many different challenges than the first, but publishing the quality work of our colleagues makes those challenges well worth the labor. That labor was shared by several new reviewers for this issue that offered assistance and for them we are very grateful. Their effort allows us to maintain the academic standards expected of a peer-reviewed journal. A point of pride in this volume, consistent with our stated desires as editors, is the noticeable Illinois emphasis.

We are grateful for the many submissions and have the enviable editorial remorse that we could not publish all the scholars that submitted academically strong work. We certainly look forward to another high quality issue in 2010 and hope that some of the changes that have been "invisibly" implemented behind the scenes prove valuable to the future editors of this fine journal (and for us for at least one more year). An important change for next year's journal includes transitioning into an electronic format, dispensing of the print version. Details will be worked out at our annual conference. For submissions guidelines please refer to the closing page of this journal.

It is our goal as editors to continue to provide a mix of political science fields for our readers and the important Illinois taste either in article topic or authors. We look forward to future submissions and are certain that the annual Illinois Political Science Association Conference will continue to provide high quality scholarship for publication. Information about the upcoming conference may be obtained from any of the officers listed in the closing pages. We hope to see you all at the 2009 conference hosted by the University of Illinois at Chicago. Enjoy.

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Political Advertising in the Illinois Press[1]

Andrew D. McNitt, Eastern Illinois University

   Students of political parties can use political advertising to study the changing nature of campaigns. Political advertising begins to appear regularly in newspapers early in the twentieth century. This paper analyzes ads appearing in three Illinois papers on the Monday preceding each presidential election for the period 1904 to 1996. Changes in the type of political advertising used and the presence of partisan mentions in ads are examined as indications of the extent to which candidates ran individualized as opposed to party centered campaigns. The results indicate that political advertising was from the beginning candidate centered. Single candidate ads have always predominated and multicandidate and general party ads have always been rare. Newspaper advertising is more partisan than television advertising. Further, while there has been a decline in the willingness of candidates to identify their partisan affiliation, this decline did not occur until relatively late, after 1972. Finally, attack advertising, fluctuates over time and was much more common in the 1912-1916 period than it is today.

Introduction

If you want to understand how political campaigns have developed over time you have to look at the evidence that they have left behind. Political advertising is one form of evidence which can be used to study the changing nature of American politics. Newspaper advertising in particular offers us the opportunity to look at how the public language of politics has developed over an extended period of time.

This study examines all political advertising which appeared in three Illinois papers on the day or, in the case of weekly papers, the issue, immediately prior to presidential elections held between 1904 and 1996. The ads are used to answer three questions: First, has there been a change in the number of political ads printed in newspapers over time? Second, has there been a decline in the willingness of candidates to identify their party

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affiliations in their ads? Third, has there been a change in the kind of political ads that are run?

The first question to be addressed is whether the rate of political advertising in newspapers has changed over time. Most of what has been written about political advertising has been published after 1980 (Devlin, 1989; Joslyn 1980; Johnson and Elebash, 1986; Kaid and Davidson, 1986; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, 1991; West, 1994; West, 1997) and, with only a few exceptions (Humke et al., 1995; Latimer, 1984; Latimer, 1985), has concentrated on television advertising.

Political consultants and scholars have argued that the declines in newspaper circulation and the greater emotional impact of television are reasons for concentrating on television advertising. There are, however, a number of excellent reasons to look at newspaper advertising. Newspapers were mentioned by survey respondents as the principal source of political information in the United States until 1963 (Stanley and Neimi, 1995, Table 2-12). Daily newspaper readership in 1990s ranged from a low of 41% for 18-21 year olds to a high of 70% for individuals over 65 years of age (Stanley and Niemi, 1995, Table 2-2). Newspaper readers are more likely to vote than non-newspaper readers (Steinberg, 1976). Newspapers are the dominant source of information about local elections (Alexander, 1969). Advertising themes developed for one type of media are often repeated in ads in other types of media.

Rather than assume that newspaper advertising is no longer relevant, we need to actually examine whether or not candidates make use of the medium. By looking at advertising rates over a long period of time it is possible to determine the extent to which newspaper advertising is still used.

The second question is whether there has been a change in the willingness of candidates for public office to identify party affiliation in their ads. One indicator of the strength of a political party is the willingness of its candidates to publicly identify themselves as belonging to it. A strong party runs as a team. A weak party is merely a collection of independent candidates. Both conventional wisdom and a number of scholars argue that political parties are declining in importance in the United States (Broder,

1972; Agranoff, 1972; Crotty and Jacobson, 1984; Keefe, 1994). The exact point at which parties fall apart is, however, less clear. The events which are usually cited as causes occur over a long period of time, the decline is variously attributed to the development of direct primaries (1903), the decline of patronage (post 1945), the rise of television advertising (post 1954), the increase in independent voters (post 1966) and the McGovern era reforms (post 1972). The argument for decline, however, is not universally adhered to and some evidence, such as the rise of the service party and increased party line voting in Congress, seems to at least partially contradict it (Cotter et al., 1984; Kayden and Maye, 1985; Rohde, 1991). None the less since both conventional wisdom and the preponderance of evidence suggests a decline, we hypothesize that there will be a reduction over time in the willingness of candidates for office to identify their political party in their ads. Further, we expect that the point at which this decline occurs will provide us with an indication of causes of that decline.

With only a few exceptions, estimates of the extent of partisan mentions are found mostly in studies of televised advertising. Humke, Schmitt and Grupp (1975) studied 849 ads published in the Bloomington Pantagraph between Sept. 1 and election day of presidential years from 1932 through 1960. They found that 88% of those ads identified party affiliation. Joslyn (1980; 94) examined 156 presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial spots broadcast between 1960 and 1976. Joslyn found that candidates identified their political party in only 10% of the ads and that identification of party was influenced by the office sought, region of the country and incumbency. In a similar vein, West (1997; 46-49) found that prominent televised presidential ads shown between 1953 and 1996 were less partisan after 1960, and more substantive during the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, Johnson and Elebash's (1986;307) study of newspaper ads and partisan broadcasts in the United Kingdom, a country noted for having generally more cohesive political parties, found that 92% of 104 ads and broadcasts run in 1983 were overtly partisan.

Care, however, must be taken in interpreted data which estimates the rate of partisan advertising. First, there is a difference

between the rate of partisan mentions in the original ad copy and the rate of partisan mentions in broadcast and printed copy, which is effected by how frequently different kinds of ads are run. In this study each presentation of an ad is counted separately even if the same copy has already been run while a number of other studies (Johnson and Elebash, 1986 and West, 1997) look at original ad copy and pay no attention to the frequency of presentation. Second, the point in a campaign were ads are placed also may have an impact upon the type of ads being run. This study looks at ads run on the day before the election. While this provides a constant point of comparison which can be used to determine how newspaper advertising has changed over time the tendency for some campaigns to return to more positive themes immediately prior to an election may complicate attempts at directly comparing these results to measures of total ad content.

The third general question is whether there has been a change in the type of advertising which is run. In this study ads are classified as positive single candidate, positive multicandidate, general party, attack, informational and other. Strong parties run as a team. Consequently, we hypothesize that party based and multicandidate advertising should be more common during the early twentieth century and individual candidate ads should be more common during the late twentieth century. Further, we hypothesize that the increase in negative advertising which occurs in televised ads after 1970 (Sabato, 1981; Kaid and Davidson, 1986; Johnson-Cartee and Copeland, 1991; West 1997) will also be found in newspaper advertising.

Factors other than changes in party organization can also influence political advertising. Changes in newspaper operations, the kind of office sought and the presumed electoral fortunes of a political party can all have an effect. The relationship between newspapers and political parties has changed over time. Newspapers were overtly partisan in the nineteenth century, but became much more independent in the twentieth century. This increasing independence is particularly evident after the Second World War.

The office sought also has an impact on advertising style (Joslyn, 1980; Latimer, 1985). Some offices are policy making while others are largely administrative. Specifically, presidents, governors, members of Congress and state legislators hold the most policy oriented of all of the public offices. Consequently, we hypothesize that candidates for those offices will run more pointed ads. They also should be more prone to identify their party affiliation and to use attack advertising than candidates for other offices.

The perceived electoral fortunes of candidates for public office should also influence the type of advertising that is used. Candidates from the majority party should be much more willing to identify their party affiliations in their ads and run as a team. In terms of this study, the Republican party since 1860, has been the majority party in McLean County (Bloomington) and Coles County (Mattoon), and was the majority party in Cook County (Chicago) until the 1930s. Further, the readers of all three of these papers originally had close ties to the Republican party and their readers are still more likely to be Republican. Consequently, we hypothesize that Republican candidates will be more likely to mention their party affiliations and run multicandidate ads than Democrats. Conversely, Republican candidates should also be less likely to run single candidate ads than Democrats.

Empirical Study

This paper examines advertising in three Illinois papers; the Chicago Tribune, the Bloomington Pantagraph and the Mattoon Journal Gazette, on the day before or in some case the issue before presidential elections held between 1860 and 1996. Originally this study was going to be a formal content analysis of all candidates ads from that period, however, the vast bulk of all such ads are found after 1904. Consequently a detailed content analysis was performed only on that latter period.

There are several reasons why these papers were selected. First, they allow us to obtain information about political advertising for an extended period of time. Second, they provide information about political advertising in a major metropolis, a middle sized city

and a small town. Third, since all there of these papers are located in the same state, it is easier to make comparisons because of a common electoral calendar.

The unit to analysis used in this paper is the political ad. All ads appearing in the selected issues were included in the study and all coding was done by the author. The information being coded is straightforward. Partisan ads are any ads that identify the party of the candidate in the text either in print or with the use of traditionally recognized partisan symbols. The type of advertising is classified as single candidate, multiple candidate, attack, party, informational and other. Single candidate ads, 64% of the total, are positive ads advocating the election of a single candidate. Multicandidate ads, 7% of the total, are positive ads advocating the election of more than one candidate. Attack ads, 15% of the total, are any ads which include either an attack on the character, performance or policies of a candidate and / or comparisons between one candidate's character, performance or policies and another's. Party ads, 1% of the total, are ads that advocate support for a party's candidates in general, but do not name individual candidates. Informational ads are ads which provide information to voters on such topics as where to call for a ride to the polls, when a speech or broadcast will occur, how to cast a split ticket or where political meetings will occur. All remaining ads, .1% of the total, are categorized as other and were dropped from the analysis because of the very small number of cases (1).

To establish the extent to which other individuals would classify newspaper ads in a similar manner using this coding scheme, a subset of 121 ads was selected for analysis. After a brief explanation of the coding system, a graduate student independently coded for the principal variables. The results indicate substantial agreement. Specifically, the two coders gave the same answers for each trait as follows: Partisan mentions 93%, Single candidate ads 94%, Multiple candidate ads 96%, Attack or comparison ads 93%, Informational ads 100%, and General party ads 98%.

While political ads are clearly identified as such after the First World War, earlier advertising is often unidentified. For the most part ads can be recognized by their format, text and style.

There are, however, a small number of cases where the newspaper's official endorsement of a political party or candidate is closer to modern advertising than editorial opinion. Specifically the Mattoon Journal Gazette in 1880 inserted lines periodically through out the entire issue exhorting voters to "Vote the Straight Republican Ticket" which, given the date of publication, were in all probability editorial endorsements. In addition, early in the twentieth century there are also pieces which pictures of all of party's candidates for county office printed under the title "Our Candidates for Office" which given the year and political position of the paper are also most likely an editorial endorsement. Although some cases of mistaken identity are possible, especially in the nineteenth century the number is probably very small and for the most part confined to the first few election periods in the formal data set.

Analysis

As originally conceived, this paper was supposed to be an analysis of political advertising from 1860 through 1996. Table 1, however, indicates why a shorter time period was selected. [editor's note: all referenced tables and figures have been relocated to the conclusion of the article]

While there is abundant commercial advertising, there is relatively little political advertising in the late nineteenth century press. The papers of that era were overtly partisan. While the advent of the penny press in 1833 is occasionally cited as the end of the partisan press, the change was actually very gradual. While most newspapers in the middle of the nineteenth century reduced their prices, increased their circulations and became commercial enterprises, they often retained their original partisan dispositions. Newspaper directories published toward the end of that era listed only a quarter of all papers as independent in 1880, one third in 1890 and not until 1920 were half of all papers listed as independent (Mott, 1950 411-413).

The earliest political ads are, as already mentioned, difficult to identify. The first ads appear to be political announcements. Published references to campaign advertising can

be found in the earliest editions studied. The Mattoon Journal Gazette on Nov. 2, 1860 advertises, at a rate payable in advance, for announcements of candidacy. Short notices that indicated the establishment of or meeting times for local political organizations also appear early and can be found in the 1860 Bloomington Pantagraph.

Political ads appear to have roots in both commercial advertising and editorial comment. Commercial advertisements are common in the 1860 issues of all three papers and are of several types. Newspapers originally printed professional cards listing the occupations of independent businessmen. The Tribune in 1855 established a yearly advertising rate for these cards which allowed for weekly changes in content. In 1857 merchants began adding descriptions of the goods they were selling to their cards (Wendt, 1979 57-58). Further, an examination of these three newspapers also indicates that at least as early as 1860 (Pantagraph 1860, Tribune 1864, Journal Gazette 1876) commercial advertising was being printed which made reference to the election and candidates who were running for office. Editorial comments along with most of the rest of these papers were highly partisan. In 1860 all three papers were not only supportive of, but especially in the case of the Chicago Tribune, were also closely allied with the Republican party. The usual practice, again as early as 1860, was to list, on the editorial page, under the logo, the full Republican ticket that was then followed by an editorial endorsing those candidates. As time went on, other announcements of a partisan nature began to appear. In some cases these announcements were set up in separate illustrated blocks that eventually began to look like, but probably were not yet paid ads. What seems to have happened is that by the early twentieth century when papers became much less partisan, political parties and independent candidates began to pay for these items. The professional card became the personal ad. The complex commercial ad was transformed into the longer argumentative political ad. The editorial printing of the endorsed ticket became the multicandidate general party ad.

This sudden increase in political advertising that occurred during the first twelve years of the twentieth century then is a major

change in the way campaigns were conducted. Paid advertising replaced the overtly partisan press as a method of persuading and mobilizing the electorate. This change incidentally comes at about the same time (1907) Illinois adopted the direct primary.

Table 1 also indicates that newspaper advertising remains a major avenue for political campaigning. While there is considerable fluctuation in the number of ads printed over the years, newspaper advertisements continue to appear long after the advent of television and the arrival of electronic campaigns. While there is a post 1980 drop in the number of ads appearing in the Tribune, this dip is only slightly greater than earlier dips and not accompanied by similar dips in the number of ads appearing in either the Pantagraph or the Journal Gazette.

There are two ways to examine changes in partisanship over time, the first is to examine trend lines and the second is to do a regression analysis where differences in time are treated as independent variables. In this paper, the examination of trend lines is complimented by a regression analysis. Regression was used in this analysis because of the easy comparability of the regression coefficients and the superior ability of this technique to deal with infrequently occurring variables. Regression in this case is simply a way to summarize trends and produce results that in fact prove to be similar to those obtained with the alternate technique logistic regression.[2]

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[2] Logistic regression is designed to deal with estimation problems which occur when dummy dependent variables are used. The logistic results identified exactly the same variables (significance and direction) as having an impact on the dependent variable as did the ordinary least squares regression equations for partisan mentions, single candidate advertising, multicandidate advertising, informational advertising and attack advertising. For general party advertising, the only difference was that general party advertising was identified as significantly more likely to occur in the ordinary least squares regression run, but not the logistic run.

The regression model used in this paper is as follows:[3]

$$Y = a + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + b_3x_3 + b_4x_4 + b_5x_5$$

Where

x_1 = year
x_2 = pre and post television (after 1954)
x_3 = pre and Post McGovern (after 1972)
x_4 = party
x_5 = level of office sought (policy making or not)

Figure 1 presents information about changes in partisanship over time. The rates of partisan mentions, 57% for the entire time period and 63% for the comparable time period, is less than Humke, Schmitt and Grupp's finding of 88% for newspaper ads published between 1932 and 1960. Both studies, however, indicate that newspaper ads are substantially more likely to indicate partisan affiliation than the much lower results reported for televised ads. Partisanship is identified in a substantially greater proportion of the advertising than the 10% of ads initially reported by Joslyn (1980, 1984 43). Partisan mention rise in 1916 and remain high until 1972 when there is a fairly noticeable drop that is consistent with Joslyn's (1984) study of television advertising. In thirteen of the fourteen elections held between 1916 and 1968 the proportion of ads which identified candidates' political parties exceed 56% and the high point in fact came in 1968 when 83% of ads included a party affiliation. In five of the seven elections held between 1972 and 1996 partisan

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[3] As with most time series data, the time related variables are to some extent multicollinear. Specifically, the Pearson's correlation for year and advent of television is .84, year and McGovern reforms is .75, and McGovern reforms and advent of television is .63. Consequently, caution should be used in interpreting the significance level of the coefficients. The regression coefficients should be used in conjunction with the trend lines and treated as simple summaries of the existing trends. Variables measuring the differences in advertising in the three papers were dropped from this equation because of statistical insignificance in an initial run.

mentions are found in 50% or less of all ads with the low point reached in 1972 when only 37% of ads included party affiliations. These results confirm the prediction of a decline in partisanship, but the decline occurs much later than predicted. The decline is not associated with either the advent of the direct primary in 1907 or the advent of television advertising in the 1950s; rather it appears after the 1972 McGovern Reforms and increases in the number of independent voters.

In Figure 2, separate trend lines are presented for partisan mentions by each party. There are substantial differences between the two parties in the extent of partisanship in their candidates' ads and those differences vary over time. As hypothesized Republicans have equal or greater rates of partisan mentions than Democrats in 15 of 23 elections. Most interestingly of all, the post 1972 decline in partisan mentions is most pronounced in Democratic ads and only reverses itself in 1996 when Clinton runs for reelection. The Republican ads avoid party labels in 1972, but have fairly high levels of partisan mentions from 1976 through 1988. Further, Democrats are more willing to identify their partisan preferences in 1912, 1936, 1948 1964 and 1996, all of which were years when the Democratic presidential candidate won. The Republican candidates on the other hand, seem less effected by changing political fortunes. While Republican mentions are unusually high in 1924, 1948 and 1968, all of which, at least initially, seemed to be unusually good years for the Republican presidential candidate, mentions were extremely low in the Republican landslide year of 1972.

Figure 3 presents information about the changing nature of advertising. Newspaper advertising begins as single candidate advertising and largely remains so except for two brief periods of decline, 1912 to 1916 when a relatively large number of attack ads were run as well, and 1944 to 1948 when a relatively large number of informational ads were run. The regression results in Table 2 actually indicate a small, but significant ($p \leq .05$) decrease over the entire time period in the rate of single candidate advertising. There are, however, also small, but significant increases in single candidate advertising after the advent of television (1954) and the McGovern party reforms (1972). In addition, the regression indicates a

significant tendency for Republican candidates to use single candidate advertising. While the evidence is more mixed for single candidate advertising, the notion that there was a large increase in single candidate advertising over time is rejected. What actually seems to have happened is that a slow long term drop in single candidate advertising, was interrupted by a sudden dip in 1948 followed by a recovery to slightly less than previous levels by 1972.

Multicandidate advertising is more partisan. Eighty three percent of all multicandidate ads identify the candidates' party, while only 56% of single candidate ads do. The trend lines in Figure 3 indicate that multicandidate advertising is rare and that there is relatively little change in its rate except possibly for a slight increase after 1988. The regression analysis in Table 2, indicates in general a small, but significant increase over time, with a reduction, however, following the McGovern reforms of 1972 in the rate of multicandidate advertising. The regression results also indicate a slightly greater use of multicandidate advertising by candidates for nonpolicy making offices and Republican candidates. Consequently, the prediction of a general decline in multicandidate advertising is rejected.

The prediction of an increase in negative advertising in the 1980s and early 1990s is supported to a limited extent. The trend lines in Figure 3, however, indicate that rather than a general pattern of increasingly negative advertising, there is a fluctuating pattern with peaks in 1912-16, 1956 and 1993. The failure of all of the time related variables in the regression analysis presented in Table 2 to be statistically significant provides further evidence of the fluctuating nature of attack advertising. The only significant variable in the regression analysis is type of office, which indicates that candidates for policy making offices are more likely to use attack advertising.

Attack advertising is common, i.e. found in 44-50% of all ads, only for the 1912-16 period. Only 1984, 1992 and 1996 match the findings for television commercials (West, 1997) of an increase in negative advertising, even though the rate of attack ads, 29%, 22% and 21% respectively, is lower than the more than 50% reported by West for the post 1980 period. In fact, the proportion

of attack ads in newspaper advertising in general is some what lower than the one third of all commercial reported by Sabato (1981 166), the 27% of televised senatorial ad reported by Kaid and Davidson (1985 195), and much lower than the 54% of prominent ads reported by West (1997 57). There are four possible explanations for this difference. First, newspaper advertising may well be less negative than television advertising. Second, the newspaper ads under consideration appear shortly before election day and their more positive nature may reflect the efforts of candidates to conclude their campaigns on a positive note. Third, the other studies may misestimate the actual rate of negative television advertising because their figures are based on convenience samples (Joslyn, 1980), samples of principal ads (West, 1996) , and /or an analysis of original ad copy which makes no references to the number of times an ad is run (Johnson and Elebash, 1986). This study on the other hand, takes account of all ads run on the sample day and consequently provides a more accurate estimate of the actual advertising rates. Fourth, studies of television advertising include more ads from candidates for major state and national offices than this study of newspaper ads which includes more (47%) ads from the more numerous state legislative and local races.

Consistent with Jewell and Olson's (1988) speculation, purely partisan advertising is very rare (1% of all ads). The trend line in Figure 3 is largely flat with only the tiniest indication of an increase in party advertising after 1972. The regression analysis in Table 2 supports this conclusion. There is a small, but statistically significant increase in general party advertising after 1972. The regression results also indicate that this type of advertising is associated with ads for nonpolicy making offices.

Discussions and Conclusions

Content analysis is limited by its very nature and this study is no exception. These results, however, compare favorably with other studies of political advertising in terms of the number of ads examined, the number of sources sampled, the time period covered and the comparability of the data. The major problem with content

analysis of political advertising is one of sampling. Only a small number of all of the ads which have been printed or broadcast can be examined because of the time consuming nature of data collection and coding. Consequently, problems of generalizability arise. While strictly speaking these results apply only to the newspapers and dates sampled, they none the less capture at least the outlines of several important events.

First, a revolution in political communications occurred early in the twentieth century with the end of the partisan press and the arrival of paid advertising. This new style of communications had an individualizing impact on elections from its inception. The advent of paid advertising allowed candidates to buy ads in papers that generally were not supportive of their candidacies. Both pro Wilson and pro FDR ads appear in the Chicago Tribune (1916, 1932, 1935 and 1940) which in Wilson's time was a Republican paper which had supported T. R.'s Bull Moose candidacy in 1912 and in FDR's era was virulently anti Roosevelt.

Second, newspaper advertising continues to be used as part of the advertising mix in political campaigns. Rather than replace newspaper advertising, television ads seem simply to have been added to the mix. Consequently, students of political campaigns would do well not to concentrate exclusively on television advertising. Other media should also be examined.

Third, the decline of parties argument is supported, but not in quite the way which was expected. While newspaper advertising in general is much more partisan than television advertising, there is a decline in partisan mentions in newspapers, but the decline occurs much later (post 1972) than expected. Further, in this sample much of the decline in partisan mentions of candidates is a result of Democratic, but not Republican candidates avoiding their party's label after 1972.

Fourth, while newspaper advertising is generally less negative than television advertising, the rate of attack advertising varies over time. The notion that American politics has entered and unusually negative era is overblown. The modest increases in attack advertising in 1988 and 1992 are consistent with some of the studies of attack advertising (West, 1997) which report an increase form the

nineteen seventies to the nineteen eighties. This study, however, examines advertising over a much longer period of time and from this perspective the high point for attack adverting is much earlier. In this sample attack advertising is highest during the 1912-16 period. The three-way presidential election of 1912 and Wilson's 1916 reelection with its divisive questions of war and peace would seem to be necessary, if not sufficient explanations for this hostility. Other factors are probably involved given the much more civil tone of similar elections (1932, 1936, 1940 and 1968) which also dealt with divisive questions of war, peace and economic policy.

Finally, there is a need to try to maintain some sense of historical perspective about the nature of American politics. Students of campaigns and elections draw too great a contrast between traditional (pre television) and modern (post television) politics. While there are important differences, traditional political campaigns were more candidate centered than is generally acknowledged (note the prevalence of single candidate advertising early in the twentieth century and the concomitant lack of general party and multicandidate ads at this time). Modern political campaigns are not nearly as devoid of partisan concerns (at least up until 1972) as some believe. Many of the changes in campaign style that are attributed to "modern" media centered campaigning actually have their origins early in the twentieth century. Yes dramatic changes occurred, but the most dramatic change of all was the shift to individual campaign advertising that occurred at the very beginning of the twentieth century.

Table 1: Political Advertising Over Time (# of Ads)*

Year	Tribune	Pantagraph	Journal Gazette
1860	0	2 notices	0**
1864	0	0	0**
1868	0	0	_
1872	1	0	_
1876	10 notices/1-2 ads	0	0**
1880	6 notices	0	0**
1884	0	0	0**
1888	0	0	0**
1892	0	0	0**
1896	0	0	0**
1900	0	0	2** possible
1904	2	0	0**
1908	0	15	0
1912	5	8	3
1916	14	7	11
1920	2	4	4
1924	11	10	7
1928	10	2	2
1932	7	7	6
1936	7	13	11
1940	17	23	17
1944	_	10	8
1948	14	13	16
1952	12	46	17
1956	7	9	13
1960	7	14	23
1964	8	45	23
1968	19	12	12
1972	33	41	16
1976	19	18	35
1980	7	16	31
1984	4	4	16
1988	4	10	5
1992	4	11	17
1996	2	4	12

* Excludes ads supporting/opposing state/local referendums
**weekly

Table 2: Regression Models for Ad Types With Selected Independent Variables

B (betas)

	Partisan	Single	Multiple	General	Information	Attack
Constant	-2.82	13.66*	-3.55	.07	-10.83*	1.67
Year	.002 (.08)	-.007 (-.31)*	.002 (.17)*	-.000 (-.01)	.006 (.39)*	-.001 (-.05)
TV	.12 (.12)*	-.23 (.24)*	-.00 (-.00)	.006 (.03)	-.24 (-.37)*	.01 (.01)
McGovern	-.39 (-.38)*	.22 (.22)*	-.07 (-.15)*	.03 (.12)*	-.15 (-.23)*	-.01 (-.02)
Party@	.04 (.04)	.08 (-.08)*	.08 (.17)*	-.01 (-.06)	.02 (.04)	-.01 (-.02)
Policy Making@@	-.30 (-.31)*	.01 (.01)	-1.0 (-2.0)	#	-.06 (-.09)*	.16 (.23)*
R^2	17%	7%	2%	7%	6%	
N	782	782	793	782	782	
F	31.66*	12.45*	3.54*	13.11*	9.28*	

* = P ≤ .05   ** = P ≤ .10

This variable is dropped because the distinctions between policy making and nonpolicy making office does not apply to general party advertising because general party advertising does not mention specific offices sought.

@ Positive values indicate a greater tendency for Republican candidates to evidence this trait.

@@ Positive values indicate a greater tendency for policy making offices to evidence this trait.

Figure 1: Partisan Mentions in All Ads

Figure 2: Partisan Mentions by Party

Figure 3: Type of Ads over Time

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
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The Use Of Campaign Websites By Low Visibility State And Local Candidates In Illinois

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This study examines the use of websites by candidates running for state and county offices in 2008. It analyzes the extent to which websites are used at this level as well as the features, functions, and issues employed on campaign websites. The study finds Web use related to office sought and county location but not party affiliation. The findings point to marked differences between high and low visibility candidates in both quantity and quality of website campaigning. Low visibility candidates are less likely to engage in Web politics, and those that do make limited use of the Web. Conclusions suggest this is the result of the nature of low-visibility campaigns, which are characterized by a lack of campaign resources, little media attention, and reliance on traditional methods of campaigning. The paper ends with a discussion of why this milieu will provide a lucrative field of study for political scientists in the future.

Introduction

In the past two decades candidates running for office have increasingly recognized the importance of using campaign websites in an effort to reach voters. Websites provide a way to present detailed information about candidates in the form of text, pictures, audio and video files. In the beginning, election campaign websites were mainly simple devices with few details or campaign purposes. Labeled "brochures in the sky"[1] they offered the candidate little more than a presence on the Internet (Bimber and Davis 2003; Davis 1999; Ireland and Tajitso 2001). Over the years websites have become increasingly sophisticated with graphic images, video files, social networking, text messaging, blogging, and podcasting with

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[1] In the lexicon of web design a pejorative term that refers to a website or page that replicates the features of a printed brochure and translates them directly to the Web. It is often used to describe a website that is static and uninteresting.

RSS[2] feeds to personal computers, cell phones, and mp3 players (Gaziano and Liesen 2008).

Campaign websites are used to solicit voters, communicate issue positions, recruit volunteers, raise money, and project candidate images. Websites provide a good way to understand the functions of the online campaign as well as the strategies employed to attract voters. They offer a means for candidates to tell voters about themselves, identify their issue positions, stress accomplishments, contrast themselves with their opponents, and highlight endorsements. At the same time, websites afford an opportunity for citizens to become cyber-activists by donating money, and sending email messages to the candidates.

Web technologies enable candidates to operate differently than when using traditional mass media. The Web provides a means for candidates to disseminate a wide variety of information without regard for space limitations found in television, radio, and newspapers. It also allows for two-way communications between the candidates and the public.

Using campaign websites, candidates have the potential to dramatically alter the way campaigns are conducted in this country. They can improve the flow of information to the citizenry and between the candidates and the public. They can also dramatically increase the quality of information available to the voting public. However, the extent to which candidates and the public are taking advantage of these new technologies has not yet been adequately studied.

Research on the use of campaign websites has largely been confined to the study of what high visibility candidates (those running for presidential, U.S. Senate, and gubernatorial offices) are able to accomplish during an election campaign (Foot and Schneider 2006; Chadwick 2006; Gaziano and Liesen 2008). Little systematic attention has been paid to the use of websites by low visibility candidates (those lower down the ballot running for lesser known

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[2] RSS stands for Really Simple Syndication. It is a web feeding mechanism that allows subscribers to receive updates automatically.

state and local offices, such as, state representative, county board president and county commissioner).

Campaigns at these lower levels of office tend to be characterized by having much less money, receiving less media coverage, and fewer opportunities to make appeals directly to voters. Candidates at this level are likely to engage in campaign activities that do not require use of expensive mass media such as television and radio advertising. Instead, the focus is mainly on door-to-door canvassing, and less expensive media, such as, brochures, posters, yard signs, and fliers (Kingdon 1968; Leuthold 1968).

It seems that low visibility candidates could make use of website campaigning because of its low cost, extensive reach, and potential to raise money, recruit volunteers, and solicit votes. However, little is known about the campaign practices of these candidates.

This study seeks to begin to remedy this deficiency in the literature by examining website use among candidates running for several offices at the state and local level in Illinois during the 2008 presidential campaign. It seeks to answer five questions: How widespread is the use of campaign websites? Is there a difference in use based on office sought, party affiliation, or county location? What specific content is found on campaign websites? What campaign functions are served by campaign websites? What issues are emphasized?

Literature Review

Over the past ten years, the way political candidates have used the Web for campaigning has evolved significantly. From the "brochureware" websites to the interactivity of blogs, the Web has evolved into an essential aspect of campaign strategy for most candidates running for high visibility office. The growing popularity of the Web is evidenced by the fact that in 2006, 97% of Senatorial candidates used websites, compared to only 55% in 2002 (The Bivings Group 2006).

The Web was first used in 1992 by the Clinton-Gore campaign. Their website included full text of their speeches, political ads, position papers, and biographies. While it represented a large quantity of information, it was not an interactive website.

Most websites in the 1990s were set up to help candidates win by transmitting information that the candidates could control. This was not much different than print or broadcast media (Stomer-Galley 2000). It led Davis to predict that the Web would not be a revolutionary tool capable of altering the political power structures and expanding political participation. Instead, in 1999 he argued that in the future the Web would be dominated by the same political elites who currently hold power. In 2002, this prediction seemed to becoming true. The candidates with the most sophisticated technological innovations were incumbents from the two major parties (Davis 1999; Latimer 2005).

In 1996 the Web became a more interactive medium. Lamar Alexander was the first presidential candidate to make his website interactive by engaging in on-line discussion sessions with voters (Davis 1999). However, this did not start a trend of websites designed for interactive communications with the public. In a study of 100 candidate websites in 1996, Davis found that only three candidates had bulletin boards and only two had electronic town hall meetings. He concluded that the primary function of candidate websites was to disseminate information about campaigns and not to engage in two-way communication with the public.

Davis (1999) pointed out that interaction with the public was not especially useful for the candidates. Email contact with visitors to their websites typically produced messages from non-constituents, while the candidates' requests for volunteers and donations went largely unanswered. The novelty of the technology and the lack of confidence in the security of the Internet may have contributed to these disappointing results.

By the 2000 presidential election campaign, candidate websites were still being described as "brochures in the sky" and at best a transitional stage on the way to more significant changes in web campaigning (Chadwick 2006). These websites were still largely created by volunteers and were rarely updated (Ireland and Tajitso

2001). According to Bimber and Davis (2003), candidates used their websites to present their qualifications for office mainly by demonstrating their experience in politics. They tried to identify with the voters by presenting their personal histories with pictures of their families. The candidates also attempted to establish empathy with voters by posting issue positions on their websites.

Most candidates structured their websites with their supporters in mind, rather than the uncommitted voters and journalists who were frequent website visitors (Bimber and Davis 2003). Candidates used their websites to encourage supporters to donate, become volunteers, and display signs and posters that could be downloaded off their websites. When the Federal Election Commission relaxed the rules regarding fundraising online in 1999, it enabled the candidates to use the Internet for fundraising quickly and more directly from the average voter (Chadwick 2006). They also encouraged supporters to endorse the candidate by emailing the media, and their friends, who might still be undecided. Candidates also utilized their websites to reinforce their political messages to supporters by spinning events in updated news messages sent through listservs (Davis 2005).

Interactivity also expanded only slightly during the 2000 election campaign. Instant messaging and chat rooms were made available on Al Gore's website so that his supporters could network, but the effort did little to get more people politically engaged (Davis 2005). Also, in 2000 the candidates in the presidential election campaign encouraged voters to register and vote by posting email reminders. This technique appeared to be successful because a survey reported by Bimber and Davis (2003) found that 84% of citizens who visited candidate websites said they voted.

In the 2000 presidential primary campaign John McCain became the first candidate to demonstrate the power of the Internet to raise large sums of money in a short period of time. After his surprise win in the New Hampshire primary, McCain raised $20 million dollars online in less than a week. The fact that his campaign money came from small donations made it even more attractive, enabling McCain to claim access to strong grassroots

support and to decry the "special interest" money of his opponent (Semiatin 2005).

An even more impressive political accomplishment was achieved by Howard Dean in the 2004 Democratic presidential primary. Dean combined social networking and online fundraising to double the money raised by McCain. In one online fundraiser Dean appeared in a video sitting at the edge of a desk eating a sandwich. He asked viewers to join him in this "common man" fundraiser, contrasting it with the black tie $200 a plate dinner held by his opponent, John Kerry. This gimmick proved very successful in enhancing Dean's reputation as a candidate and enabled him to be a leader in the early stages of the 2004 presidential campaign (Semiatin 2005).

Both the McCain and Dean examples demonstrate the attractiveness of the Web as a fundraising device and provide a possible explanation for the fact that nearly 97% of high visibility candidates used the web to solicit campaign contributions in 2008 (Gaziano and Liesen 2008).

The 2004 election campaign was also significant in demonstrating the use of campaign websites to engage volunteers. They emphasized recruiting volunteers, and asking supporters to send endorsement letters to newspaper editors and talk radio hosts. Presidential candidates also used their campaign websites to encourage constituents to conduct house parties, and solicit their friends to canvass neighborhoods, and participate in get-out-the-vote drives (Davis 2005; Chadwick 2009).

For the first time in a presidential campaign, both Bush and Kerry included video clips on their websites. These contained attack ads and issue ads that never aired on television (Postelnicu, Martin, and Landreville 2006). Also, in 2004 the Web became a more important source of campaign contributions. George W. Bush raised $14 million from online donations, while John Kerry managed to raise six times more--$82 million (Davis 2005). By the 2004 presidential election it was evident that the Internet had become a significant source of small donations of less than $20, thus creating a "small dollar democracy" (Anstead and Chadwick 2009).

Unlike the presidential web campaigns, the literature suggests that House and Senate candidates operate somewhat differently. In the 2006 mid-term elections, the Bivings Group examined how websites were used in the U.S. senatorial campaigns. They found that the majority of senatorial candidate websites included news, biographies, contact information, volunteer forms, and opportunities to donate. Interestingly, only 23% of the websites had blogs, and 55% of the websites included audio and video clips. The authors reasoned that Senatorial candidates either do not have the time to blog, or they perceive it as politically risky and an unproven campaign tool (The Bivings Group 2006).

In another study of 444 House and Senate websites from 2002 and 2004, Druckman, Kifer, and Parkin (2007) analyzed how candidates used web technology in their campaigns. They found that candidates had a variety of technological choices that were driven by how much money they had and how competitive the races were. In other words, candidates used both practical and political considerations to influence their use of web technologies. From this analysis, the authors found that incumbents usually created less dynamic websites, while challengers were more inclined to use more interactive technologies. The most significant factor that influenced whether candidates used interactive technology was the competitiveness of the race. In close races, candidates tended to rely on presentation technologies rather than interactive media because they did not want to lose control of their campaign messages.

There has been little political science literature on the use of websites by candidates running for offices lower down the ballot. In general, the study of campaigning has been largely confined to contest for high visibility, national, and state-wide offices. Studies of campaign websites have, for the most part, not ventured beyond candidates running for the U.S. House of Representatives (Bimber and Davis 2003).

The exception is a study of state legislative candidates' use of websites by Herrnson, Stokes-Brown, and Hindman (2007). This study examined a number of factors that lead candidates to campaign online. They report that candidates with younger and

better educated constituents were more likely to engage in online campaigning. Challengers and open-seat candidates were more likely to have a Web presence than incumbents. And, white and African American candidates were more likely to have a website than Latino candidates.

Most information about state and local Web campaigning has been confined to trade journals and popular media, which provide mainly anecdotal insight into how campaigns at the lower levels are conducted (Howell 1982). Campaigns for lower level office tend to rely on grassroots methods of campaigning, such as the use of door-to-door canvassing, display media, and personal appearances. Many candidates at this level tend to count on party organizations to conduct much of the campaign on their behalf (Howell 1980). They operate in an environment of limited resources, where it is difficult to raise money (Kingdon, 1980; Alexander 1991). In addition, low visibility candidates have a hard time acquiring media attention and rarely have an opportunity to articulate issue positions (Hojnacki and Baum 1992). Campaigns are often characterized by a lack of competition and the necessity to make appeals to public officials and interest groups rather than direct appeals to voters (Howell 1982). It has also been suggested that these are low information election campaigns that are devoid of many of the commercial marketing tools found in campaigns at the higher levels of office, such as, polling, media advertising, and use of computer technology (Sheffield and Goering 1978).

Method

Participants

The sample in this study included 179 candidates running for state and local offices in Illinois during the 2008 presidential election. There were nine county offices represented. These included: county board president 3 (1.7%) , states attorney 11 (6.1%), county board member 69 (38.5%), recorder of deeds 5 (2.8%), clerk of the court 3 (1.7%), coroner 6 (3.4%), county clerk 7 (3.9%), auditor 6 (3.4%), and county board of review 2 (1.1%). There were two offices at the state level: state representative 36

(20.1%) and state senator 10 (5.6%). The sample also included 15 (8.4%) judicial candidates and 6 (3.4%) candidates for one special district, the metropolitan water reclamation district. The sample included candidates running from 8 counties in Illinois. These included: Will, Cook, Winnebago, Kane, Grundy, Dupage, Lake, and McHenry.

Procedure

This study used content analysis to analyze the websites of the 179 candidates running for state and local office. The coding categories for this study were based on prior coding schemes used by Wilkerson (2002), Biving Group (2006), and Gaziano and Liesen (2006; 2008). The web features consisted of 25 content categories (See Appendix B).

In this study the website content refers to all the features found on each candidate's website. They include the twenty five categories identified in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. This includes variables such as: biographies, press releases, endorsements, and photo galleries. These features were clustered into five functional categories: candidate information, communications, solicitation, mobilization, and education (see Table 2).

In addition websites were coded according to three political variables identified as independent nominal variables in this analysis. These included, office sought, political party affiliation (includes only the two major party candidates), and location (counties). These explanatory variables helped to categorize the sites into specific groups for comparison and analysis.

Issue content was also coded (see Table 6). If a candidate identified an issue on his or her website it was counted. No attempt was made to identify direction, specificity, or quantity of coverage given to each issue.

The data was collected in the last two weeks of October and the beginning of November in 2008 and was analyzed using SPSS. Descriptive statistics were generated and analyzed to develop an overall picture of the kind of website tools that were used by candidates in the 2008 election. A chi-square test was run to

examine the relationship between the three independent variables: office sought (county-wide, state representative or senator, and commissioner of county board), location (county), and party affiliation (Democrat or Republican) and the dependent variables, the subject matter found in the website (web features, web functions).

Results

Table 1 identifies the number of candidates in the sample that used campaign websites in 2008. [editor's note: all referenced tables have been relocated to the conclusion of the article] For purpose of analysis, candidates are divided into four categories based on the type of office sought. These include candidates for: 1) county-wide office[3], 2) commissioner of county board, 3) state representative and state senator, and 4) judicial office.

The data indicate that candidates seeking county-wide office made the most use of websites (78.6%). Almost as many candidates running for state office used campaign websites (71.7%). However, far fewer candidates seeking a seat on the county board had websites (44.9%) and only one third (33.0%) of judicial candidates employed a website.

Web Features and Functions

Table 2 identifies the 25 web features found on campaign websites. These web features are divided into five campaign functions. They include: 1) providing information about the candidate, 2) communicating with the public, 3) soliciting financial contributions, 4) mobilizing volunteers, and 5) educating the public about the election.

The data indicate that candidate information was the most important function of low visibility candidate websites. Biographies (53.0%), press releases (31.2%), endorsements (30.1%), photo galleries (27.3%), and issue positions (26.8%) were the most

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[3] These offices include: president of county board, states attorney, and recorder of deeds, clerk of court, coroner, county clerk, county auditor, and county board of review.

prominent items. About half as many mentioned their achievements (14.5%) or included video files (12.8%). Even less attention was given to the use of audio files (2.2%), and talking about the opponent (.5%).

Communication with voters was the second most important function. Visitors to the websites were encouraged by almost half of the candidates (43.0%), to contact the campaign. However, only a few offered additional techniques for visitors to stay in touch with the campaign. Just (10.0%) provided for an email sign-up. Even less provided a survey (3.3%) or newsletter sign-up (2.7%). Except for a very few who provided a blog (1.1%), none used the new technologies available for this function, such as, podcasting[4], social networking[5] and text messaging[6].

Soliciting donations was the third ranking function of campaign websites. As many as (40.7%) of the sample used their websites to ask for money. Almost all of these candidates had a PayPal[7] link that enabled their contributors to use a credit card. However, few websites offered other ways to raise money, such as, selling merchandise (1.1%).

Almost as many candidates attempted to mobilize voters through their websites. About 40 % had a volunteer sign-up (38.5%) feature on their website. Only 10% tried to engage volunteers online and fewer still asked visitors to tell a friend to support the candidate (3.3%), send a letter to a friend (3.3%) or contact the media on behalf of the candidate (1.6%).

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[4] A podcasting is the process of producing audio or video digital files which are distributed over the Internet and can be downloaded to portable mp3 players, personal computers, or cell phones.

[5] Social networking establishes Web based communities (called personal networks) that help people make contacts with like-minded people. This can be done by joining websites such as MySpace, YouTube, and Facebook.

[6] Term used for text based communication that sends short (160 or fewer characters) messages.

[7] PayPal is a service that is provided for free and allows people to transfer money online.

More than a fourth of the candidates (27.9%) attempted to perform an educational function by providing an events schedule on their websites. A fifth of the candidates (21.2%) provided voter information. This means they offered non-partisan facts about registration and voting designed to help citizens cast a ballot. It also includes information about: location of polling places, contact numbers, registration information, and early voting procedures. For many of these low visibility candidates the educational function also meant providing information about the duties of the office sought and how to find the candidates on the ballot. Also listed in this category are links to other websites (18.4%). For most of the candidates in our sample the links were to the national and state party organization websites and television, radio, and newspaper outlets.

Party Differences and Web Features

Table 3 compares the use of web features by party affiliation. Overall, the data suggests that Democrats and Republicans used their campaign websites in similar ways. Very weak correlations were recorded on most of the web features indicating little or no differences between Democrats and Republicans. Only 5 of the 25 web features reached statistical significance: biography $(1, X^2=4.363, p<.037)$, achievements $(1, X2=20.476, p.<.000)$, email sign-up (messages) $(1, X^2=4.030, p<.045)$, email sign up (volunteers) $(1, X^2=4.030, p<..045)$, and voter information $(1, X2=5.347, p<.021)$.

In each of these cases Republicans were more likely to have these features on their websites than Democrats. However, this data must be viewed with caution because in some cases there were small numbers collected, leaving open the possibility of error in interpretation. In these cases, the evidence may not be strong enough to reject the null hypothesis. These findings are similar to those reported by Herrnson, Stokes-Brown, and Hindman (2007) in a study of state legislative candidates. They found little or no statistical differences between the two parties, but concluded that

Republicans were more likely to outpace Democrats in the use of web technologies.

Office sought by web features and functions

An examination of the differences among the three political types of office sought and the use of web features are presented in Table 4. A chi square test using office sought as the independent variable and web features as the dependent variable show that three of the web features reached statistical significance, biography (2, X^2+ 13.012, p.<.001), photo gallery (2, X^2=8.002, p.<.01), and endorsements (2, X^2=8.002,p.<.01). The statistical significance differences are accounted for by the fact that the county-wide and state candidates employed these features much more than candidates for the county board. There is a marked similarity between the county-wide and state candidates on all the features in this category. Candidates running for county-wide or state office are twice as likely to provide personal information about themselves than candidates running for commissioner of the county board.

On the web features under the communication function only one reached statistical significance, the contact us feature (2, X^2=16.381, p. < .000). Here, the same pattern emerged as with candidate information. Candidates for county wide and state offices were twice as likely to ask visitors to their websites to contact the campaign as county board candidates.

Similar findings occurred with the functions of solicitation and education. Both county-wide and state candidates were twice as likely to ask for money as candidates running for county board. On the education function there was a statistically significant difference on event scheduling (2, X^2=10.825, p. <.004). Both county-wide and state candidates were more likely to employ this feature.

The only exception to the pattern was on the function of mobilization. Two features reached statically significance, volunteer signup (2, X^2=7.262, p. <.02) and tell a friend (2, X^2=8.759, p<.01). It

was the county-wide candidates who used these features more than the other candidates.

Counties by web features and functions

For purposes of analysis, the eight counties in this study were combined into four categories. These included: Cook, the collar counties, central Illinois, and down-state counties. This was done to help differentiate candidates based on the political divisions of the state. Distinction is often made between Cook County, which contains the city of Chicago, and the collar counties which are the mostly Republican suburbs, as well as the central and down state counties which represent medium, small town and rural Illinois.

An analysis of the web function of candidate information shows five web features reaching statistical significance: biography (3, X^2=21.581, p<.000), press releases (3, X^2=16.790, p<.001), photo gallery (3,X^2=12.458, p<.006), stands on issues (3,X^2=16.905, p<.001), and video files (3,X^2=14.254, p<.003). The differences on biography and press releases are accounted for by the fact that these features are widely used by candidates outside Cook County, particular those running from the collar counties. Photo gallery is used by candidates mainly in the collar counties and central counties but not in Cook or downstate. While taking stands on the issues and offering video files were almost exclusively found among candidates in the collar counties.

On the communication function two features reached statistical significance, contact us (3, X^2= 11.26, p<.01) and email sign-up (3, X^2=10.320, p<.01). Again, in both of these cases the candidates from outside Cook County were more likely to offer an opportunity for website visitors to communicate with the candidate; this was especially the case for those in the collar counties.

The same results were found on the solicitation function. Asking for campaign contributions reached statistical significance (3, X^2=20.042, p. <.000). Candidates outside Cook County, particularly in the collar counties, were more likely to ask for money on their websites.

Under the mobilization function, two features reached statistical significance, volunteer sign-up (3, $X^{2=}$11.246, p <.01) and email sign-up (3, $X^{2=}$10.320, p<01). The same pattern accounts for the differences. Candidates outside Cook County are more likely to employ these features than those in Cook County.

The educational function had three features that reached statistical significance, events scheduling (3, X^2=7.735, p<.001), links (3, X^2=15.684, p<.001), and voter information (3, X^2=9.083, p<.02). In each of theses cases the difference was accounted for by a difference between Cook County candidates and those running from other counties. It was the candidates outside of Cook that were more likely to employ these features on their websites.

Issues

Issues were not a major concern of most candidates in our sample. As Table 6 points out only 48 (26.4%) used their websites to identify issue positions while the vast majority of the candidates 131 (72.0%) did not. Among those who stressed issues the focus was on a narrow range of domestic issues that impact state and local government. The emphasis was on taxes 25 (13.7%), energy 20 (11.0%), education 19 (10.4%), transportation 17 (8.3%), health care 15 (8.2%), and the economy 13 (7.1%). Only a few chose to talk about other issues. These included: crime 6 (3.3%), ethics 6 (3.3%), home rule 4 (2.2%), budget 3 (1.6%), children/family issue 3 (1.6%), immigration 2 (1.1%), and drugs 2 (1.1%). Reproductive rights 1 (.5%), corruption 1(.5%), and land use 1 (.5%) were lest likely to be mentioned on campaign websites.

No mention was made of domestic issues that received national prominence by candidates higher up the ballot, such as, social security, the national debt, veteran affairs, agriculture, or the issues associated with the cultural wars, such as, same sex marriages, and stem cell research (Gaziano and Liesen 2008).

Discussion

This study suggests that the use of websites is not as prevalent as studies of high visibility candidates would indicate. For example, in 2006 it was reported that 97% of senatorial candidates had websites (Bivings Group 2006). Almost 80% (78.6%) of the county-wide and 71.7% of the state candidates employed a website but that far fewer candidates running for county board (44.9%) and judicial office (33.3%) had websites. The data indicate that the farther down the ticket one goes the less likely there is to find candidates using website technology.

The findings of this study also indicate that there were differences among the candidates on the basis of office sought and location. Candidates running for county-wide and state office were similar to each other, but different from county board and judicial candidates on the use of website features. County-wide and state candidates were more likely to solicit volunteers, ask for money, and provide ways for website visitors to communicate with the campaigns than county board or judicial candidates.

It may be that many low visibility candidates are not yet convinced of the usefulness of websites as tools to reach voters. It is also possible that most still rely more on the traditional methods of campaigning, such as, personal appearances, display media, and get-out-the-vote drives conducted by party organizations.

This study also reported differences among the candidates based on the location of the county. Candidates from Cook County were much different in there web behavior than the other candidates, especially those in the collar counties. Cook County candidates made much less use of website features than others running for the same offices. This is probably due to the nature of the one party politics in this area and the strength of the Democratic county organization. Once Democratic candidates for state and local office in Cook County reach the general election they face little or no opposition and are not pressured to engage in rigorous campaigning.

The results also indicate that there is a clear differentiation between candidates at the state and local level and candidates

running for national and state-wide office (Gaziano and Liesen 2006; 2008). The low visibility candidates employed far fewer features on their websites than high visibility state-wide and national canidates. Many of the methods used by candidates to inform voters about themselves, such as, audio and video files, photos, and issue positions were much more likely to be found on high visibility candidate websites than on low visibility campaign websites This was the case with almost all the functions listed in Table 2.

The most notable differences between high and low visibility candidates were in the use of new technologies. In 2008 presidential candidates began the widespread use of blogging, podcasting, text messaging, social networking, and offering an En Espanol button that converts the website from English to Spanish. There is little or no evidence that any of these devices are being used by candidates at the state and local level. In fact, the overall conclusion that can be drawn from the data is that candidates at this lower level of office are trailing far behind high-visibility candidates in developing and using web technology.

It may be that candidates lower down the ticket do not have the money or access to the hi-tech expertise needed to employ new technologies. It may also be that since candidates at these low levels receive little media attention, they think of websites as only useful for provide name recognition and some basic information about their candidacies.

An examination of campaign issues also indicates differences between the low level candidates and those higher up the ticket. It was discovered that a large number of low visibility candidates failed to take issue stands on their websites and those who did chose only a narrow range of issues. Many of these issues were not the same as those chosen by candidates running for national or high visibility state-wide office (Gaziano and Liesen 2006; Gaziano and Liesen 2008).

The lack of concern for issues by many low visibility candidates may suggest that they recognize the importance of party identification in influencing voter choices. The data collected here seems to indicate that candidates do not engage in the same campaign strategies as the high visibility candidates. It is possible

that models that emphasize the importance of short term forces, such as, candidate image and issue positions are not as appropriate at this level of politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979).

In general, the findings of the study suggest that campaigning at the lower levels is much less demanding than campaigns for offices higher up the ticket. The more candidate-centered, hi-tech, media driven campaigns have not yet reached these lower levels of office. Instead, it seems that low visibility candidates are operating in a more traditional environment, where campaigning reflects a style that is reminiscent of the 1950s and 60s rather than the 21st century.

Limitations and Future Directions

This exploratory study of low visibility candidate websites had a number of limitations. First, it could have included a larger sample size with more counties represented in the sample. More candidates would have provided a better opportunity to analyze the data, given the fact that so many did not engage in website use and among those that did, several did not use many of the web features employed by candidates in high visibility races. A better representation of the four types of counties would also have been helpful. Second, other independent variables should have been included in the study. Most notably missing was incumbency status. The incumbency factor may be useful in explaining the lack of campaigning and some of the unique findings in this study, such as, the failure of so many candidates not to utilize campaign websites. Finally, the use of interviews or other survey methods would help to answer questions about why some features commonly used by candidates higher up the ticket were not employed at the lower levels.

Obviously, state and local usage of the Web for election campaigns will be a fruitful area of study in the future. The 2008 election campaign witnessed the emergence of several new companies that are catering their software products to candidates who are running in local races. This is seen as a potentially profitable

market of over one million candidates that will run in over 500,000 state and local races (Shaha 2008). One of the consulting firms that has offered its services to state and local candidates is WeTheCitizen, an online networking consulting company. The company states that it builds, deploys, and manages personalized platforms that create social networks and helps campaigns recruit volunteers and a base of support (Wethecitizens 2009). Another web campaigning company is Politcs4All. It provides a platform for interest groups or candidates to create networks in addition to tracking bills, facilitating meetings, and organizing campaigns (Twitter 2009).

ElectionMall is another company that offers a wide range of services to candidates, including assistance in managing staff and potential supporters, fundraising, and promotions by email, phone, fax, and online ads. Finally, the newest company is Piryx, which describes itself as a non-partisan company that attempts to build social networks via the Internet in order to promote democracy and equality. Piryx states that its software products can help track campaign contributions and file financial reports as well as create social networks and help with fundraising (Piryx 2009).

It seems evident that state and local Web campaigning offers an environment with much potential for political science research in the future. The emergence of Web consultant companies that are willing to make their expertise available to state and local candidates, the relatively low cost of this new media, and the number of voters attracted to campaign information online suggests a bright future for studying this style of campaigning.

Table 1 Use of Websites by type of office

Office	Website	No Website	Total
County Wide	33 (78.6%)	9 (21.4%)	42
County Board	31 (44.9%)	38 (55.1%)	69
State rep or senator	33 (71.7%)	13 (28.3%)	46
Judge	5 (33.3%)	10 (66.7%)	15
Total	**102 (59.3%)**	**70 (40.6%)**	**172**

Table 2 Content of Campaign Websites

Web Features	Number Using	Not Using	Total
	Candidate Info		
Biography	95 (53.0%)	84(46.9%)	
Press releases	56 (31.2%)	123 (68.7%)	
Endorsements	54 (30.1%)	125 (69.8%)	
Photo gallery	49 (27.3%)	121 (67.5%)	
Stands on issues	48 (26.8%)	131 (73.1%)	
Achievements	26 (14.5%)	153 (85.4%)	
Video files	23 (12.8%)	156 (87.1%)	
Audio files	4 (2.2%)	175 (97.7%)	
Opponent Information	1 (.5%)	178 (99.4%)	
	Communication		
Contact Us	77 (43.0%)	102 (56.9%)	
Email sign-up (messages)	18 (10.0%)	161 (89.9%)	
Survey	6 (3.3%)	173 (96.6%)	
Newsletter	5 (2.7%)	172 (96.0%)	
Blogs	2 (1.1%)	177 (98.8%)	
	Solicitation		
Contribute	73 (40.7%)	106 (59.2%)	
Merchandise	2 (1.1%)	177 (98.9%)	
	Mobilization		
Volunteer sign-up	69 (38.5%)	110 (61.4%)	
Email sign-up (volunteer)	18 (10.0%)	161 (89.9%)	
Tell a friend	6 (3.3%)	173 (96.6%)	
Send letter to friend	6 (3.3%)	173 (96.6%)	
Free Merchandize	5 (2.7%)	174 (97.2%)	
Send letter to media	3 (1.6%)	176 (98.3%)	
	Education		
Events schedule	*50 (27.9%)*	129 (72.0%)	
Voter Information	*38 (21.2%)*	141 (78.7&)	
Links	*33 (18.4%)*	146 (81.5%)	
Total			**179**

Table 3 Party by Web Features

Web Features	Dem N=111	Rep N=58	X^2	P<
Candidate Info				
Biography	56	39	4.363	.037*
Press releases	36	20	.072	.788
Endorsements	34	20	.260	.610
Photo gallery	35	14	1.012	.315
Stands on Issues	31	17	.036	.850
Achievements	7	19	20.476	.000***
Video Files	15	8	.003	.960
Audio files	1	3	1.012	.315
Opponent Information	0	1	1.925	.165
Communication				
Contact Us	47	30	1.352	.245
Email sign-up (messages)	8	10	4.030	.045*
Survey	3	3	.679	.410
Newsletter	3	2	.001	.978
Blogs	0	2	3.873	.049
Solicitation				
Contribute	45	28	.929	.335
Merchandise	1	1	.221	.638
Mobilization				
Volunteer sign-up	42	27	1.197	.274
Email Sign-up(volunteer)	8	10	4.030	.045*
Tell a Friend	2	4	2.800	.094
Send a letter to friend	3	3	.659	.417
Free Merchandize	3	2	.074	.786
Send letter to media	2	1	.001	.971
Education				
Event Schedule	33	17	.003	.955
Voter Information	19	19	5.347	.021*
Links	16	17	5.379	.020

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table 4 Office Sought by Web Features and Functions

Web Features	CtyWide N=42	CtyBd N=69	State N=46	X^2	P<
Candidate Info					
Biography	29	28	13	13.012	.001***
Press releases	14	15	23	9.953	.007**
Endorsements	17	13	18	8.002	.018**
Photo gallery	17	13	18	8.002	.018**
Stands on Issues	11	19	18	13.012	.001***
Achievements	10	10	6	2.222	.329
Video Files	8	3	11	9.975	.007
Audio Files	2	0	2	3.234	.199
Opponent Information	1	0	1	2.756	.252
Communication					
Contact Us	25	20	29	16.381	.000***
Email sign-up(messages)	7	6	3	2.770	.250
Survey	1	3	2	.324	.851
Newsletter	0	1	4	9.640	.008**
Blogs	0	0	2	4.888	.087*

Solicitation						
Contribute	24	21	24	26	10.871	.004***
Merchandise	0	0	2	2	4.888	.087*
Mobilization						
Volunteer Sign-up	20	20	20	24	7.262	.026**
Email sign-up (volunteer)	7	6	3	3	2.770	.250
Tell a Friend	0	1	5	5	8.759	.013**
Send a letter to Friend	0	3	3	3	2.629	.269
Free Merchandise	0	0	5	5	12.462	.002***
Send a letter to Media	0	2	1	1	1.194	.550
Education						
Events Schedule	14	12	21	21	10.825	.004***
Voter Information	9	12	14	14	2.735	.255
Links	8	12	12	12	1.349	.509
Total						157

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

(Continued) Table 4 Office Sought by Web Features and Functions

Table 5 Counties by Web Features and Functions

Web Features	Cook	Collar Counties	Central Counties	Downstate Counties	X^2	P<
CandidateInfo						
Biography	6	29	16	17	21,581	.000***
Press releases	3	19	7	7	16.790	.001***
Endorsements	6	12	16	4	4.828	.185
Photo gallery	5	15	12	1	12.458	.006**
Stands on Issues	4	18	5	6	16.905	.001***
Achievements	2	8	4	6	4.151	.246
Video files	2	9	0	2	14.254	.003**
Audio files	0	2	0	0	5.409	.144
Opponent Information	0	1	0	0	2.685	.443
Communications						
Contact Us	7	23	13	10	11.262	.010*
Email sign-up (messages)	2	9	1	3	10.320	.016*
Survey	0	1	0	0	7.506	.057
Newsletters	0	1	0	0	3.983	.263
Blogs	0	0	0	0		

Solicitation						
Contribute	5	25	11	10	20.042	.000***
Sell Merchandise	0	1	0	0	2.685	.443
Mobilization						
Volunteer sign-up	4	21	15	9	11.246	.010**
Email sign-up	2	9	1	3	10.320	.016*
Tell a friend	0	1	0	0	2.831	.418
Send a letter to friend	0	2	0	1	3.585	.310
Free Merchandise	0	0	0	0		
Send letter to media	0	2	0	0	5.409	.144
Education						
Events schedule	3	13	12	3	7.735	.052*
Voter Information	0	8	7	9	9.083	.028*
Links	1	9	2	10	15.684	.001***
Total						**143**

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

(continued) Table 5 Counties by Web Features and Functions

Table 6 Issues Discussed on Campaign Websites

Issues	Number 48	Percent
Taxes	25	13.7%
Energy/Environment	20	11.0%
Education	19	10.4
Transportation	17	9.3%
Health Care	15	8.2%
Economy	13	7.1%
Crime	6	3.3%
Ethics	6	3.3%
Home Rule	4	2.2%
Children/Family	3	1.6%
Budget	3	1.6%
Immigration	2	1.1%
Drugs	2	1.1%
Reproductive Rights	1	.5%
Corruption	1	.5%
Land use	1	.5%
Total N		**179**

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Appendix A:
Content Categories for Coding Sheet

1. Biography: Does the website provide a biography of the candidate?
2. Stands on the Issues: Does the website provide issue positions of the candidate?
3. Press Releases: Does the website provide press releases?
4. Opponent Information: Is there any discussion of the opponent on the website?
5. Voter Information: Does the website provide visitors with information on registration and voting?
6. Achievements: Does the website have a page that identifies the accomplishments of the candidate?
7. Photo Gallery: Does the website have a collection of campaign pictures?
8. Endorsements: Is there a place on the website that lists endorsements?
9. Events Schedule: Does the website provide a schedule of the candidate's appearances?
10. Audio Files: Does the website offer a way to listen to the candidate?
11. Video Files: Does the website provide video clips of the candidate?
12. Links: Does the website have Links to other sites?
13. Merchandise: Does the website provide downloadable campaign materials?
14. Email Sign-up: Does the website have a sign-up for news and campaign information?
15. Volunteer Sign-up: Is there a way for visitors to the website to become volunteers?
16. Contribute: Does the website provide the ability to make donations online?
17. Tell a Friend: Does the website encourage visitors to contact their friends about supporting the candidate
18. Email Media: Does the website encourage media contact?
19. Email Friend: Does the website encourage visitors to email friends to support the candidate?
20. Contact Us: Does the website provide contact to candidate/ campaign?
21. Blogs: Does the website have a campaign blog?
22. Podcasts: Does the website offer a podcast?

Visits and Votes: The Geographic Spread of Campaign Visit Effects in the 2008 Presidential Primaries

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Presidential primary candidates make strategic decisions about where to visit in their efforts to secure their party's nomination. These strategic decisions tend to favor large urban areas. We examine the geographic reach of such visits. Using candidate campaign fundraising visits and public appearances by county in Illinois, Missouri, and New York between September 1, 2007 and Super Tuesday on February 5, 2008, we investigate how each candidate's visits impacted their county vote shares. Our analysis shows that candidate appearances can affect vote shares in both the county visited and the surrounding counties. The effects of visits can sometimes span across state lines and even spread throughout an entire media market. They do not, however, extend equally throughout a state and residents far from the urban centers favored by the candidates may remain completely unaffected by these ploys for votes, leaving an uphill battle for rural voters in the general election.

Introduction

During the Presidential Primary season, there are a plethora of candidates competing for votes and attention, many of them traveling the nation in search of crowds waiting to hear their message. The campaign is, quite literally, brought to the people. While these campaign stops can take many forms, from a nationally televised debate or appearance on a network newsmagazine to local fundraisers or stump speeches, and may be hyper localized or very broad in scope, these visits allow the candidates to interact with the electorate. These interactions are, however, by nature limited. Candidates cannot visit entire states at once. A visit to a state is really a visit to a particular location within it. Just how far, geographically, does the impact of that visit extend?

In this paper we examine the impact of presidential primary campaign visits on votes at the county level and the reach of that impact geographically into surrounding counties, throughout media markets, and across state lines. We expect that visits to a

county will boost a candidate's success both there and in surrounding counties, where access to the event requires minimal travel and news of the visit easily spreads. We also expect that candidates may enjoy increased support throughout the media markets they visit, as excerpts from the campaign events are broadcast on the local news throughout the market. In the first section, we provide a brief overview of the literature on campaign visits. We then explore the geographic reach of visits in three specifically chosen states: Illinois, Missouri, and New York. We outline the candidates' patterns of visits in these states, describe the geographic patterns of votes observed, and then test the impact of visits on votes within counties and across the geographic boundaries of counties, states, and media markets. We end with a discussion of how visits may reinforce geographic patterns in candidate support.

The Role of Visits in Presidential Campaigns

During presidential campaigns, candidates crisscross the states visiting potential voters in their efforts to win the race. But what do these visits get them? According to John Aldrich, "to understand the behavior of the candidates and the outcome of the pre-convention portion of the campaign for the presidential nomination, one must understand the goals of the candidates and the other relevant actors, the choices that each candidate can make, and the possible outcomes of those choices." (Aldrich 1980 p. 49). In the early stages of the campaign, labeled the invisible primary, the emphasis is on gaining visibility, viability, and funds. These are necessary for a candidate's survival. To succeed, a candidate must build name recognition and then turn that into the momentum they need to go on to secure the nomination. Campaign visits can help generate publicity and name recognition for political candidates as they pick up "free" local (and potentially national) news coverage. Candidate appearances also influence a voter's reaction to and knowledge about a candidate (Vavreck et al. 2002 p. 604).

Several studies have shown that visits can also translate into votes. Shaw (1999) finds that candidate visits boosted vote totals in the 1988 through 1996 campaigns and Holbrook (2002)

shows how Truman's visits helped secure his victory in the contentious 1948 general election campaign. Shaw (1999) also finds that visits help Democratic candidates more so than Republican candidates. Holbrook (2002) tells us that each stop inside a state will boost vote totals, and that one visit for each state has a different effect than multiple visits per state. Campaign events are also found to sway public opinion, although they may not influence election outcomes (Holbrook 1994). Campbell (2001) finds that campaigns *can* influence the electorate, albeit only 25% of the time, barring a popular incumbent. Wolak states that the intensity of a presidential campaign can increase voter turnout, with higher intensity campaigns promoting a larger turnout from voters (Wolak 2006 p. 359). From these studies it seems clear that while campaign visits may not always swing election outcomes, they have the potential to do so.

While these studies provide a strong foundation in understanding how visits shape votes, they all focus on general election campaigns. We instead examine the role of visits in the presidential primaries. Studying presidential primaries poses several additional challenges for scholars. Past partisan vote distributions offer little help in establishing baseline measures of likely candidate support. Candidates must fully earn their support; they typically have no past foundation of support to rely on, they cannot rely on their party label for winning votes, and must build support from scratch on their own. Thus, in this period candidates seek not only votes, but the visibility, viability, and money winning them requires. Campaign visits are one method candidates can use to secure these.

As the first contests draw nearer, an attempt to win votes should become the primary focus. Candidates must make decisions about how to best allocate resources in their efforts to secure the nomination. These decisions include strategic ones about where to visit. Gurian (1986, 1990) investigates how campaigns make such decisions. His interviews of campaign strategists suggest that the number of delegates at stake in a contest weighs heavily in campaign resource allocation decisions. Aldrich (1980) hypothesized that the more delegates at stake in a contest, the more likely a primary candidate would enter it and Gurian (1986) finds that

campaign resource allocation to a state is positively and significantly related to the number of delegates at stake there. The method of delegate selection can also affect campaign strategy decisions. Proportional methods of delegate selection, mandated by the Democratic Party and used in some states for the Republican Party as well, guarantee that candidates who secure the minimum threshold of votes receive some delegates for their campaigning efforts. This may provide incentives to campaign some in states a candidate cannot win outright. Teasedale (1982) predicted that the switch to proportional representation allocation by the Democratic Party would mean that candidates would no longer sit out some states' contests. In contrast, Gurian (1990) hypothesized that, where a choice existed between winner take all and proportional representation contests, candidates would devote more resources to the winner take all ones because they have a higher delegate-to-votes ratio. His examination of campaign spending by state in the 1976, 1980, and 1984 primaries failed to confirm this. He also theorized that candidates lacking frontrunner status might focus heavily on early contests with proportional representation as part of a strategy for gaining not only delegates but also momentum. Meanwhile, candidates with little chance of winning a nonproportional primary, might be expected not to campaign in it, regardless of the number of delegates at stake (Aldrich 1980). In the 2000 presidential primary, however, neither the percentage of national delegates at stake nor the contest type had a significant effect on Bush campaign visits. Only early contests mattered (Rice 2005). From this, we should expect candidates to make more frequent visits to states with early contests. We might also expect them to favor those with large numbers of delegates at stake. The type of delegate allocation may also affect visit patterns although the precise effects of allocation method remains unclear.

Most studies of campaign visits have focused on their impact on vote totals at the state level. On the one hand, a focus on impact at the state level makes sense – election coverage focuses on who carries a state and winning states means winning delegates. However, in the primaries, where contests are not necessarily winner-take-all, a winning strategy for candidates may involve trying

to carry certain regions of states rather than the state as a whole. In addition, focusing on the state-level impact of campaign visits obscures understanding of who campaign visits sway and how far visit effects reach.

The Context

We focus on candidate visits within three states: Illinois, Missouri, and New York. As bordering states with contests on the same day, Illinois and Missouri provide good cases for study of the impact of campaign visits and their geographic reach. On the Republican side there was no favorite son in these states and at least two of the major candidates actively campaigned in each state. That was not the case for the Democratic side; since Obama was a Senator from Illinois, we added New York, Clinton's own "home" state, as a comparison.

All three states held their contest on Super Tuesday, traditionally a make or break day that decides each party's eventual nominee. In 2000, when 16 states and American Samoa held their contests that day, Cook nicknamed it "Titanic Tuesday" (Cook 2000). Competitors typically drop out within a few days later and in 2000, two days after Super Tuesday only one candidate per party was left in the race. This campaign season, Super Tuesday occurred a month earlier and failed to conform to past patterns with Huckabee staying in the race until March 5, when McCain had won the 1,191 needed delegates and with Clinton staying in until June 7 when Obama had won 2,201 delegates, surpassing the 2,118 needed to clench the nomination. Still, these Super Tuesday contests drew intense campaigning for candidates knew that without major victories that day, their campaigns would be dead in the water. Part of this campaigning involved visits to these states.

With the possible exception of candidate's home states, in primaries, all states are potentially competitive. Unlike in most general election contests, Republicans choose to actively compete in blue states like Illinois and New York for the Republican delegates at stake there. Red and blue state labels are temporarily irrelevant. Since the primaries are used to nominate a candidate from each

party, the overall partisanship of each state should not have an effect on any candidate's vote share, as voters choose which ballot (Democrat, Republican, or third party) they would like to cast and then choose from a list of candidates from the same party.

Procedure

To discover where each candidate appeared on any given day, we utilized the Lexis-Nexis database to access campaign coverage.[1] Using the keywords "The Hotline" and "2008 Schedules," we were able to access data on candidate schedules and locations for any given day between September 1, 2007 and February 5, 2008. We chose this date range because media coverage of the primary season began to pick up near the beginning of September as the primary moved from invisible to visible and all three contests we looked at occurred February 5. Lynn Vavreck, Consantine J. Spiliotes and Linda L. Fowler utililze data collected between October 1 and February 15 in their research on the 1996 New Hampshire Republican primary. As ten years has elapsed between their research and ours; and states have begun to front-load the primary season; we decided to begin collecting our data in September, as a greater number of early primaries may cause candidates to begin their campaigns sooner than expected in order to campaign more heavily and stand out in a crowded field of contenders (Vavrek et al. 2002 p. 597). This start date also roughly coincided with the entrance of the last potentially major contender (Fred Thompson) into the race.

We utilized *The Hotline* due to the large amount of data available on each candidate. *The Hotline* gives a five-day spread on any one candidate's scheduled whereabouts and is updated each business day. While *The Hotline* does not take into account spur-of-the-moment campaign stops, we are confident that those stops that

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[1] While we are aware of concerns over Lexis-Nexis possessing incomplete transcripts of some networks' news broadcasts, to our knowledge their archive of *The Hotline* during the period we examine is complete.

received media coverage appear in our data. While candidates may not always release their schedules to the press, or they may make unscheduled stops or visits, the data gathered from *The Hotline* allowed us to compile a schedule for the Democratic and Republican candidates.[2] To confirm these were actual campaign stops, we again used Lexis-Nexis and searched for each candidate name (Obama, McCain, etc.) and location (New York, Illinois, or Missouri) on the day that *The Hotline* data suggested that each candidate would be in that area. Dates gathered from *The Hotline* that did not garner any mentions in the press, either local or national, were disregarded and treated as a cancelled event.

By browsing the newspaper and newswire stories for each day mentioning each particular candidate, we were able to determine whether a fundraiser or public event was held, along with additional information, such as the topic of discussion or the location of the event. We distinguish between fundraisers and public events as fundraisers tend to be private functions with fewer people attending, and thus less likely to garner significant news coverage, while public events allow the candidate to interact directly with area residents, thus drawing a larger crowd and more coverage from the local, or even national, media. National events, such as a press conference or appearance on a talk show, were not included in our analysis, as they would have the same effect on residents across the United States, thus having no local impact.

The Democratic candidates' travel schedules we compiled are reported in Table 1 and the Republicans' in Table 2.[3] [editor's

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[2] We collected data for Democratic candidates Hillary Clinton, Barrack Obama and John Edwards, along with Republican candidates Rudy Guiliani, Mike Huckabee, John McCain, Mitt Romney and Fred Thompson. Since all candidates except Clinton, Obama, McCain, Romney and Huckabee suspended their campaigns before the Super Tuesday primary elections, the data for candidates who dropped out was not used in our analysis.

[3] While it may seem that both candidates made few stops in the three states, one has to consider the large amount of time spent in Iowa and New Hampshire, the first caucus and primary respectively. Super Tuesday also hosted a larger number of primary and caucus

note: all referenced tables and figures have been relocated to the conclusion of the article]

The 2008 Primary Visits Schedule
Democrats

On the Democratic side, of the three states we examined, Missouri, where neither candidate enjoyed home turf advantage, should have been the most competitive. The Democratic candidates made a total of five visits to Missouri before the February 5 primary. Clinton made two public appearances in the St. Louis region and attended a fundraiser for her campaign in Kansas City. Obama made one appearance in each of these two urban centers. It would seem that each candidate placed equal emphasis on securing a portion of Missouri's 72 delegates tied to the primary. The majority of visits for each candidate (two each for Clinton and Obama) took place from mid-January to February. The candidates spent more time visiting Illinois and New York, their respective home turfs, and the source of more delegates.

Obama visited his home state of Illinois more than twice the amount of time as Clinton, and most of the visits took place before the end of October. We might expect that Clinton chose not to spend a great deal of resources in Illinois as Obama, being a sitting Senator from the state, would likely receive the majority of the 153 delegates from the state that were tied to the February 5 primary. She made no visits to the state after mid-December. Clinton participated in no publicized fundraisers held for her in the state[4], while Obama participated in one according to press reports. Both candidates addressed the Laborers' International Union of North America in Chicago. Again, the candidates stuck to the most populous area of the state, appearing in or around Chicago for all

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events than in previous years, with 24 states holding their contests on the same day. This large number of simultaneous contests also likely contributed to the relatively low number of visits to Missouri, Illinois, and New York before February 5.

[4] Fundraisers were held on her behalf though.

appearances and fundraisers. Despite Obama's dominance in the state, Clinton did not leave Illinois empty handed. The state supplied her with over $4 million in campaign contributions according to data from the Center for Responsive Politics.

The New York results seem to mirror the results for Illinois. Hillary Clinton's visits to New York, her home turf, outnumbered Barrack Obama's by more than two to one. The majority of visits for both candidates took place before the end of October, with Clinton making five of her nine public appearances in those two months. Obama's only public appearances took place during this time frame. Clinton made a total of three visits to the state for the sole purpose of fundraising, while Obama made two. The candidates mainly stayed within New York City and each candidate addressed audiences at NASDAQ and Harlem along with visiting *The View*. The pattern of visits seems to suggest that Obama conceded the 232 delegates tied to the February 5 primary contest, as he made no visits to the state after January 9. Like Clinton in Illinois, he did not leave the state empty handed on these visits. According to one report, he had already received more than $4 million in campaign funds from New York by April of 2007 (Heilemann 2007).

Republicans

The Republican visits to Missouri bare a few similarities to those of the Democratic candidates. Romney, making two visits to the state, appeared at one fundraising event along with another general public appearance. McCain made only one visit to the state, while, like Romney, Huckabee made two. All of McCain's and Huckabee's visits were general public appearances. Much like the Democrats, the Republican visits took place right before the primary, with only one visit taking place before January 29. The only candidate who made an appearance outside of the state's two main urban centers was Huckabee visiting Springfield. Missouri had 58 delegates tied to their primary.

In Illinois, Romney made the most visits. Making three public appearances, Romney placed emphasis on the Chicago area. McCain also stuck to the northern urban center, making one public

appearance and appearing at one fundraiser for his campaign. Huckabee made no visits to the state prior to the primary, thus the main contenders for the state's 57 delegates tied to the primary centered strongly around Romney and McCain. The visits to the state tended to take place near the beginning of the unofficial September 1 primary kickoff and in the first few days of February, when the primary took place.

As on the Democratic side, New York received the most visits of the three states by the Republican candidates still in the race for the February 5 primary. Mitt Romney made the most visits to the state, with seven. Out of Romney's visits, four were public appearances taking place in or near New York City, while the remaining three were fundraisers also held near this urban center. John McCain visited the state four times, three of which were to attend fundraisers for his campaign, with the remaining visit being solely a public appearance. Like Romney, McCain's visits were all to New York City. Mike Huckabee made only one public appearance in New York and held no fundraisers in the state that he himself attended. Huckabee's appearance, however, was on the O'Reilly Factor, which is aired nation-wide. Like the Democratic candidates, the vast majority of Republican visits to New York took place before the beginning of November and appeared aimed primarily at generating visibility and campaign funds. 98 delegates were tied to the Republican primary.

Political Geography

While much is known about the impact of campaign visits, much remains left to be learned. As former House Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neal, Jr. said, albeit in a different context, "All politics is local." Scholars typically code visits to states but when a candidate visits a state, she cannot visit the entire state at once. Candidates make choices about not just what states to visit and when but also what cities within those states to visit. We suspect a visit to a particular city does not impact residents across the state equally. In fact, in large states, a visit to one area of the state by a candidate might not even be reported in other areas and completely escape

those citizens' knowledge. In the following section, we examine the geographic patterns of candidate support and how candidate visits to an area impact those patterns. Using percentages of the vote by county reported by CNN.com, we map patterns in geographic support.

Votes and Visits

Talk of red and blue states helped bring geographic distributions of political support to center stage. As Figures 1 through 8 show, geographic clustering in vote patterns within states is common. Several different factors may contribute to this clustering of support ranging from shared characteristics of residents and similarities in political climates, to spillover effects from campaign visits, and shared political information due to the amount and content of campaign coverage and news aired in a media market. While a full understanding of the reasons for clustering remains outside of the purview of our current analysis, in the sections below we seek to more fully describe the clustering in voting patterns that exists and then, in the section that follows, explore campaign visits' role in producing them. We expect that visits' strongest effect on votes will be in the county visited but that visits will also produce smaller "spillover" effects into counties that share a border with it as well as in counties in the same media market.

Republicans
Illinois

Although John McCain trailed Mitt Romney by one visit to Illinois, McCain carried all but four counties, as depicted in Figure 1. Two, Rock Island and Henry, in the northwest portion of the state were carried by Romney and two in the southern end of the state, Richland and Franklin, were carried by Huckabee, who never set foot in the state. The state Republicans appear strongly in favor of McCain.

But even that depiction hides important geographical variations in support. Figure 2A shows McCain's percentage of the vote by county, shaded by level of support. Strong support of McCain (45% or higher) is much more prevalent in the northern portions of the state, where large clusters of counties voted in high numbers for him. In the southern half of the state, pockets of strong support are smaller and much more variation in vote totals exists.

Figure 2B shows Romney's percentage of the vote by county. His strongest clusters of support came in Rock Island, where he won, and two of its three bordering counties. He also enjoyed relatively strong support, while stopping short of winning, in Champaign, Platt, and Macon counties, near the center of the state. Counties bordering each other tended to vote similarly. Only a few counties had large deviations in Romney vote percentages from all of their in-state neighbors. Alexander and Adams, two of the biggest exceptions to the pattern, both border state lines.

Huckabee's percentages of the vote by county, depicted in Figure 2C, also exhibit geographic clustering. He did worst in the Chicago area, where both McCain and Romney made multiple visits. With few exceptions, his showing in the southern half of the state was far better than in the northern half and counties tended to vote similarly to those that shared their borders. Again, the most notable exceptions to the trend were those that border a state line. Vermillon county on the border with Indiana voted for Huckabee in far greater margins than its neighboring Illinois counties.

Missouri

As Figure 3 shows, in Missouri, Huckabee carried the most counties. Huckabee's support was most widespread in the southern portion of the state, cut a narrow swathe up the center, and was also strong in the northeast portion of the state. Romney won the cluster of counties north of Kansas City and two counties that share a border with Illinois while McCain carried many of the counties that don't share a border with Kansas on the western side of the state from the center up as well as a number of counties in the east

central portion of the state, including St. Louis. Support in these counties yielded enough votes for McCain to win the state.

As Figure 4A shows, many of the counties in the far southern section of the state voted for Huckabee at percentages near or above 50%. Perhaps the southern border with Arkansas, where Huckabee served as governor, contributed to this strong showing. Huckabee's final Missouri campaign stop on February 1 in Springfield also falls in this region. His lowest percentage of the vote by far was in one of the most populous counties – St. Louis – where both Romney and McCain visited just days before the vote on Super Tuesday. Did an ill-planned visit to Springfield rather than St. Louis cost him the state or did it bring him close to carrying it?

Figure 4B shows Romney's support by county. On the eastern side of the state, Romney carried St. Charles County, the county just north of St. Louis that borders where he held his October 1 fundraiser and made his February 3 visit. He also carried Cape Girardeau, a county on the Illinois border and the home of Southeast Missouri State University. His share of the vote in this county was at least 10 points higher than its bordering Missouri counties and was closer to that of Alexander County at the far southern end of Illinois, which was also an outlier. While not winning any of the counties, his support was also strong in the area in and around Columbia and Jefferson City, near the center of the state. His other area of strong support, where he carried five of the counties, was along the Kansas border north of Bates County. His weakest support was concentrated primarily in the southern part of the state, in some counties winning as little as nine percent of the vote.

As Figure 4C shows, we again see geographic clustering of support for McCain. Some of his strongest support was in St. Louis county and the counties surrounding it. It appears his February 1 St. Louis visit paid off. While he did not come close to receiving the margin of the vote in the counties that he carried as Huckabee did in many of the counties he won, his support was enough to give him the state victory. His best showing in the state was in Carroll County and he did well in neighboring counties as well. The southern part

of the state was his weakest but he far outperformed Romney in most of the southern counties.

New York

Figure 5 shows the percentage of the votes won by McCain, Romney, and Huckabee in New York. John McCain carried every county in the state of New York. His worst showing was in Monroe County where he still garnered 41% of the vote. Much of his strongest showing, where he received 55% of the vote or more, was in the New York City area. Huckabee, meanwhile, as Figure 5C shows, fared quite poorly in this area, receiving as low as 5% of the vote. Romney had several pockets of moderate support scattered across the state. His best showing was in Monroe County, which borders Canada, with 36% of the vote and he fared similarly in the centrally located Tompkins County. County voting patterns again appeared geographically concentrated, with counties voting for a candidate in similar rates with some of their bordering counties. There were a few outliers to this pattern. McCain fared 5 points better in Chemung County, along the state's southern border, than any of its neighboring New York counties. Huckabee's best showing by far was in Allegany County, which also borders Pennsylvania, and he still only received 23% of the vote. It was however, five points better than in any of its' neighboring New York counties. Romney did well in Clinton County, which shares a border with Vermont, receiving 33% of the vote, 7 points higher than any of its New York neighbors.

Converting votes into delegates

The strong showing in some counties despite losing the states as a whole did little good for Romney and Huckabee. The Republican primaries in New York and Missouri award their delegates on a winner take all basis. Huckabee may have won the most counties in Missouri and often by the largest margins but it gave him no delegates toward the nomination. Similarly, Romney picked up nothing for his moderate second place showing in New

York.[5] The Illinois Republican contest is the only one of the three that allows for any proportionality in the awarding of delegates but that only translated into two delegates for Romney and Huckabee walked away empty handed despite carrying two counties. The behavior of the candidates seems to fit with the expectations of Gurian (1990). Huckabee, behind in the delegate count, sat out the proportional contest and reserved visits for winner take all states, particularly Missouri, where he had the best chance to win. Romney and McCain made the most visits to New York, conforming with Aldrich's (1980) and Gurian's (1986) theories that candidates will allocate more resources to states with more delegates at stake.

Democrats
Illinois

Democratic contests, in contrast, all employ proportional representation in the awarding of delegates. Barack Obama, a Senator at the time, resided in Chicago, IL and was expected to win Illinois handily. Some of his strongest showing was in the windy city where he received 73% of the vote; he fared less well in the suburbs of Cook County but still won it with 63% of the vote. As Figure 6 shows, his strongest showing was scattered across the state with 74% of the vote in Champaign County and 72% in neighboring McLean County. He also received 72% of the vote several counties away in Sangamon, eight percentage points better than in any county sharing a border with it. Several other counties were bastions of strong support compared to their neighbors: St. Clair county went 68% for Obama, 16 points higher than any of the Illinois counties that share its borders, but similar to the city of St. Louis across the Mississippi river. In contrast, Obama fared seven points lower in Boone County on Illinois' northern border than any of its Illinois neighbors, but still carried it easily with 55% of the vote. He

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[5] While the visits may not have translated into enough votes, they did seem to generate campaign funds. Romney raised nearly $1.4 million in Illinois, $1.2 million of it from the Chicago area, according to Center for Responsive Politics reports.

fared much worse in much of the southern portion of the state, far from his frequent hometown visits, where Clinton managed to carry fourteen counties. While Hillary Clinton did not enter the state near the contest date to challenge Obama head-on, she did visit the St. Louis area and these visits were reported in much of southern Illinois, particularly in those counties in the St. Louis media market. Her husband and daughter also made multiple visits to the St. Louis area. One such rally was even held by Bill Clinton in Edwardsville, IL on the Southern Illinois University Edwardsville campus. These visits appeared to pay off. Obama received 104 delegates for his home state efforts but Clinton still managed to carry away 49.

New York

In New York, Senator Clinton's home state, the tables were turned and she fared far better in vote percentages by county in her state than Obama did in his. New York has less counties than Illinois and Clinton only lost one county there, the centrally located Tompkins, where she received 40% of the vote compared to Obama's 57%. As depicted in Figure 7, she carried fourteen counties with 70% of the vote or more; Obama only faired that well in three in Illinois. She had her strongest showing in counties in the northern and eastern portions of her state and, aside from Tompkins, fared the worst in Brooklyn and Ulster where she still managed 50% of the vote. She was awarded with 139 delegates for her efforts while Obama took home 93. Thus, although each Senator handily won their home state, they also each made inroads in the others' camp. Hillary Clinton's large home state vote margins still only won her 60% of the state's delegates; Barack Obama received a slightly larger share of the delegates in his.

Missouri

The contest in Missouri, where neither candidate had a home state advantage, was hotly contested. Clinton won more counties but Obama received more votes. As Figure 8 shows, her support was highest in the southwest corner of the state where she

won a number of counties with over 70% of the vote. His support was strongest in the populous St. Louis city and county. He also did well near Kansas City and Columbia. By and large county vote totals exhibit geographic clustering but there were a few exceptions. In general, he won the urban areas and she won the rural areas. Clinton received 14 points less share of the vote in St. Louis County than in any of its neighboring Missouri counties, 8 percentage points less in Boone County than any of its neighbors and 10 percentage points less in Jackson County than any of its Missouri neighbors. She also faired poorly in Nodaway County, on the border with Iowa and home to the city of Maryville and Northwest Missouri State University, at 42% of the vote, eleven points lower than in any of the neighboring Missouri counties. In contrast, she received a nine percentage point higher share of the vote in Sullivan County in northern Missouri than in any of its neighboring counties. The results in most of the other counties exhibit geographic clustering. The total vote in the state as a whole was close with Missouri incorrectly called for Clinton that night before late returns from major cities tipped the balance and changed the call to Obama. They each walked away with 36 delegates. The behavior of the Democratic candidates in each state matches Teasedale's (1982) prediction that candidates would not sit any proportional representation contests out. Each senator made a few appearances in the other's home state where they had no chance of winning outright and managed to take home a share of the delegates.

Do Visits Effect Votes?

In this section we test the relationship between visits and votes more systematically. Our first test involves whether a visit to a county by a candidate boosts their vote percentages there. We expect that a candidate's visit will boost votes. Table 3 reports these simple regression results for each candidate in Illinois and in Missouri. In Illinois, visits had a positive and significant impact for Obama and McCain. Obama's baseline share was 55.06% of the vote and each visit increased his share by 2.24%. McCain's baseline share was 43.81% of the vote and each visit increased his share by

4.59%. It should be noted, however, that visits were concentrated almost exclusively in the Chicago area in this state, potentially skewing the results. The results also indicate that Clinton's visits, concentrated in the Chicago area, hurt her vote totals by just over twice what Obama gained. This may be less the result of her visits themselves and more a product of where she chose to make them – Obama's hometown. Romney's visits failed to have a statistically significant impact on his vote share.

In Missouri, both Democratic candidates concentrated their visits in urban areas. Obama's baseline percentage of the vote was only 34.54% compared to Clinton's 61.33%. According to the results, each visit by Obama to one of these urban areas generated a statistically significant increase in votes by 28.96%. Meanwhile, each Clinton visit made to one of these areas was associated with a statistically significant drop in votes by 25.99%. On the Republican side, visits by McCain and Romney both had a positive, significant impact on their vote percentages. McCain started out higher and gained more with a baseline vote of 31.22% and a gain of 13.78% per visit. Romney started out with a base of 23.74% and gained 12.26% per visit, although the relationship was weaker. Huckabee began with the highest baseline of the Republican candidates, 38.41% but his visits were not statistically significant and had a negative sign.

The Geographic Reach of Campaign Visits

Having established a link between visits to a county and candidates' vote share there, we now investigate the geographic reach of those visits. We expect that there might be a spillover effect that extends beyond the border of the county a candidate visits. To test this, we coded for each county whether each candidate visited a county that shares a border with it. We confine our analysis to Illinois and Missouri so that we can also test the impact of visits to a county on the bordering counties across the

Illinois-Missouri border.[6] The results are presented in Table 4. On the Democratic side, the only evidence of spillover effects was a weak relationship for Obama visits in Illinois. There he gained an additional 7.09% share of the vote in neighboring counties compared to 18.29% in the actual county visited. Much stronger spillover effects occurred on the Republican side. In Illinois, a McCain visit garnered him an additional 9.54% of the vote in the county visited and an additional 7.14% in the counties surrounding it. His visits in Missouri, however, lacked these spillover effects. While his gain in the counties visited was greater than that in Illinois, there are no statistically significant spillover effects for these visits. When the two states are pooled together, however, surrounding counties show a significant, positive spillover effect, but there is no statistically significant spillover across state lines. His gains from visits appear to stay within state lines. With the inclusion of border counties, Romney's visits no longer show a significant relationship to votes in Illinois. In Missouri, in contrast, a visit by Romney earned him an additional 12.51% of the vote in the county visited and 9.51% of the vote in the surrounding counties. When the two states are pooled together, he also shows statistically significant gains in the neighboring counties across state lines. In fact, the results suggest that a visit to St. Louis, MO may have helped him more in neighboring Illinois counties than it did in St. Louis County or its Missouri neighbors. Huckabee made no visits to Illinois.   While Huckabee still fails to show statistically significant gains in the counties he visited, there is some evidence that he gained votes in the counties surrounding them. While the sign is negative for visits to a county and statistically insignificant, it is positive for bordering counties and, in the case of the pooled Illinois and Missouri analysis, highly significant. The results suggested he gained 11.19% of the vote for every visit to a county's neighbor even though he would seem to have lost votes in the counties actually visited.

Finally, we test the impact of a visit to a media market in the individual counties of that media market, controlling for county

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[6] Visits to bordering counties in other neighbor states were also included.

visits and border county visits, again looking only at Illinois and Missouri. We used the *TV & Cable Factbook* to identify the media market each Illinois and Missouri county falls into and then matched this with visit data. A media market can be defined as a geographic area that receives the same broadcast television signal and thus the same local news. While designated market areas typically do not cut across county lines, they commonly cut across state lines. For example, the St. Louis, Missouri media market includes fourteen counties in Illinois. We expect that because counties in a media market receive the same television signal and news broadcast, that a visit to a county in a media market may impact vote totals throughout that media market. Table 5 provides the results of our analysis. On the Democratic side, visits within media markets are statistically insignificant. We see no evidence of a wider geographic impact of campaign visits. As in Table 4, visits to a particular county remain highly significant and offer the strongest impact on the vote, with Obama gaining a slightly larger percentage of the vote from his visits than Clinton lost from hers. In addition, the visits to bordering counties across state lines now achieve statistical significance. Here, Obama gains and Clinton loses by nearly equal amounts. The Republican side shows marked differences. Visits to media markets are positive and statistically significant for all candidates while visits to particular counties lose significance. All Republican candidates benefit in the media markets they visit and Huckabee enjoys the largest vote gain from his visits. Romney also continued to gain in the counties bordering the ones he visited and Huckabee's loss in the border counties across state lines is now statistically significant, and almost twice as large as the gains made throughout the media markets visited. These results suggest that the geographic impact of the Democratic candidates' visits was more localized than those of the Republican candidates.

Conclusion and Implications

Campaign visits have limited and varied geographic reach. They do not affect all regions of a state equally. While scholars typically code visits to states, not the counties or cities within them,

candidates have little hope of reaching an entire state by a visit to one city within it, particularly when that state contains multiple media markets. Sometimes the geographic reach of vote gains generated by campaign visits appear confined to the county visited. We also find, however, that they can create a spillover effect into surrounding counties or even throughout a media market. Future work should examine more explicitly the role of news coverage and campaign ads in standardizing the vote within media markets.

While campaign visits clearly play a role in understanding candidate success, many mysteries remain regarding what affects candidate vote performance at the county level. With our campaign visit data alone, we cannot explain many of the geographic patterns of support we noted or why particular counties were outliers. Candidate behavior and geographic boundaries only go so far in explaining candidate success (or lack thereof). Geographic clustering due to shared beliefs in presidential primaries is much more difficult to identify and study. Unlike for the general election where one can at least identify the party the county is predisposed to vote for and at what level, identifying which of the primary candidates began with an ideological or other advantage in an area before campaigning begins is quite difficult. Polling data at the county level to make this possible in any widespread manner would be prohibitively expensive although working backwards from demographic breakdowns in exit polls may offer some clues. Despite the challenges, it is clear that understanding the reasons for candidates' patterns of support require examining smaller geographic boundaries than state lines.

Candidates make strategic choices about where to visit. In the states we examined, candidates heavily favored visits to large urban areas. Had we examined Iowa and New Hampshire, the story would have been a different one. Candidates devote a great amount of time and resources to those states with the earliest contests (Gurian 1993). There they have the luxury, and perhaps the necessity, of visiting small town America. In contrast, in states they can only visit a small handful of times, candidates choose large urban centers where they can reach the maximum number of voters at once.   But sometimes major metropolitan areas and small town

America have very different political views and voting patterns. Small town Americans, largely ignored in most campaigns, helped George W. Bush win his elections. In the 2008 primaries, Huckabee won in small town Missouri, as did Clinton. McCain and Obama struggled there, leaving an uphill battle for both of them for small town support in the general election.

When Barack Obama referred to people in small towns as clinging to their guns and religion at a San Francisco area fundraiser, it attracted national attention and small town ire. In the primary elections in the states we examined, he faced a vote deficit in most rural areas. By the general election campaign period, both Obama and McCain ventured some outside of major cities, particularly in swing states, in an effort to woo these voters to their side.

Geography matters, not just in terms of red states and blue states, but also in urban and rural counties within them. All too often, given limited time and resources, candidates focus on the urban areas where they can gain more for the resources expended. Small town voters often go ignored, largely unaffected by visits to distant urban areas. Our results, however, particularly for the Republican candidates, offer some hope that the geographic reach of media markets can at least partially mitigate this trend. Media markets can cut across state lines as well as divisions of urban and rural. In cutting across these lines, they can also expand the reach of a candidate's visit. However, our research has also shown that just because they can, does not mean they always do. While some mystery in geographic patterns of support must remain, it is clear political geography matters and is deserving of further study.

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Table 1: Democratic Presidential Candidates' Travel

Democrats: New York

Date	Candidate	Appearance	Fundraiser	Additional Information
6-Sep	HRC	X		
8-Sep	HRC	X		
11-Sep	HRC	X		9/11 Memorial
17-Sep	BO	X		NASDAQ
19-Sep	HRC		X	New York City
24-Sep	BO	X		NYC Corrections Officers Endorsement
27-Sep	BO	X		Rally
15-Oct	HRC	X		The View
25-Oct	HRC		X	New York City
26-Oct	HRC		X	HRC Birthday Fundraiser
27-Oct	HRC	X		Harlem Rally
30-Nov	BO		X	Harlem Fundraiser
5-Dec	HRC	X		NASDQ
9-Jan	BO		X	
14-Jan	HRC	X		MLK Speech
4-Feb	HRC	X		
5-Feb	HRC	X		

Democrats: Illinois

Date	Candidate	Public Appearance	Fundraiser	Additional Information
5-Sep	BO		X	Chicago
10-Sep	BO	X		Chicago
13-Sep	BO	X		Chicago
14-Sep	BO	X		LIUNA Webcast Speech
17-Sep	HRC	X		LIUNA Conference
21-Sep	BO	X		Town Hall
25-Sep	HRC	X		"Change to Win"
15-Oct	BO	X		
31-Oct	BO	X		
18-Dec	HRC	X		
5-Feb	BO	X		Primary Night Event

Democrats: Missouri

Date	Candidate	Public Appearance	Fundraiser	Additional Information
5-Oct	HRC		X	Kansas City
19-Jan	HRC	X		St. Louis Rally
29-Jan	BO	X		Kansas City Speech
2-Feb	BO	X		St. Louis Rally
3-Feb	HRC	X		Rally in Bridgeton

Table 2
Republican Presidential Candidates' Travel
Republicans: New York

Date	Candidate	Public Appearance	Fundraiser	Additional Information
6-Sep	MR		X	New York City
10-Sep	MR	X		
17-Sep	MR	X		Discuss HRC's Healthcare Plan
26-Sep	JM		X	New York City
27-Sep	JM		X	New York City
15-Oct	MR		X	Golf Fundraiser
16-Oct	MR		X	Breakfast Fundraiser
30-Oct	MR	X		
30-Oct	JM		X	New York City
31-Oct	MH	X		O'Reilly Factor
8-Nov	MR	X		New York City
22-Jan	JM	X		New York City

Republicans: Illinois

Date	Candidate	Public Appearance	Fundraiser	Additional Information
21-Sep	MR	X		Discuss HRC's Healthcare Plan (Savoy)
24-Sep	JM		X	Chicago
30-Oct	MR	X		Chicago
1-Feb	JM	X		Chicago
3-Feb	MR	X		

Republicans: Missouri

Date	Candidate	Public Appearance	Fundraiser	Additional Information
1-Oct	MR		X	Chesterfield
29-Jan	MH	X		Florida Watch Party (St. Louis)
1-Feb	MH	X		Springfield
1-Feb	JM	X		St. Louis
3-Feb	MR	X		

(Continued) Table 2 Republican Presidential Candidates' Travel

Figure 1

Illinois Republican Presidential Primary Winners by County

Figure 2 *Illinois Republican Results by Candidate and County*

A. McCain %Vote by County

B. Romney %vote by County

A. McCain %Vote by County legend:
- <30%
- 30-34%
- 35-39%
- 40-44%
- 45-49%
- 50% or higher

B. Romney %vote by County legend:
- <20%
- 20-24%
- 25-29%
- 30-34%
- 35-39%
- 40% or higher

(continued) Figure 2 **Illinois Republican Results by Candidate and County**
C. Huckabee %vote by County

Figure 3
Missouri Republican Presidential Primary Winners by County

Figure 4

Missouri Republican Results by Candidate and County

A. Huckabee %vote by County

	<30%
	30-34%
	35-39%
	40-44%
	45-49%
	50% or higher

B. Romney %vote by County

	<15%
	15-19%
	20-24%
	25-29%
	30-34%
	35% or higher

(continued) Figure 4
Missouri Republican Results by Candidate and County

C. McCain %vote by County

Figure 5
New York Republican Results by Candidate and County

A. McCain Percentage of the Vote by County

40-44%
45-49%
50-54%
55% or higher

Bronx 56
Brooklyn 58
Manhattan 60
Queens 56
Staten Island 59

B. Romney Percentage of the Vote by County

< 20%
20-24%
25-29%
30% or higher

Bronx 22
Brooklyn 24
Manhattan 22
Queens 25
Staten Island 26

(continued) Figure 5
New York Republican Results by Candidate and County

C. Huckabee Percentage of the Vote by County

Figure 6 *Illinois: Obama Vote Percentages by County*

☐	50% or less
▤	51-55%
▥	56-60%
▨	61-65%
▦	66-70%
▩	> 70%

Figure 7 **New York**
Hilary Clinton Percentage of the Vote by County

50% or less
51-55%
56-60%
61-65%
66-70%
>70%

New York City area:
Brooklyn 50
Bronx 61
Queens 60
Manhattan 54
Staten Island 61

Figure 8 **Missouri**
**Hilary Clinton Percentage of the Vote by County**

Table 3

Visits and Votes: Bivariate regression results

Illinois

Independent Variable

Dependent Variable	Number of visits by candidiate	Constant
Clinton percentage of the vote by county	-4.72** (2.24)	40.2*** (.668)
Obama percentage of the vote by county	2.24** (1.04)	55.06*** (.824)
McCain percentage of the vote by county	4.59* (2.44)	43.81*** (.481)
Romney percentage of the vote by county	.89 (2.42)	25.85*** (.534)

Missouri

Independent Variable

Dependent Variable	Number of visits by candidiate	Constant
Clinton percentage of the vote by county	-25.99*** (4.16)	61.33*** (.673)
Obama percentage of the vote by county	28.96*** (5.60)	34.54*** (.739)
McCain percentage of the vote by county	13.78*** (4.97)	31.22*** (.463)
Romney percentage of the vote by county	12.26* (6.78)	23.74*** (.633)
Huckabee percentage of the vote by county	-8.91 (7.10)	38.41*** (.936)

Table 4 **Spillover Effects for Campaign Visits**

Clinton	Illinois	Missouri	Illinois and Missouri
Visit to county	-14.10** (6.75)	-26.27*** (4.15)	-18.39*** (6.35)
Visit to border county	1.90 (3.08)	-3.86 (2.60)	.303 (3.6)
Border cty across ste line	--	--	-10.72 (7.31)
Constant	40.10*** (.682)	61.61*** (.694)	51.39*** (.893)

Obama	Illinois	Missouri	Illinois and Missouri
Visit to county	18.29** (8.26)	29.29*** (5.57)	22.79*** (7.55)
Visit to border county	7.09* (3.77)	4.67 (2.86)	3.82 (3.71)
Border cty across ste line	--	--	12.13 (7.55)
Constant	54.71*** (.835)	34.21*** (.761)	43.87*** (.919)

McCain	Illinois	Missouri	Illinois and Missouri
Visit to county	9.54** (4.66)	13.88*** (4.95)	12.18** (5.58)
Visit to border county	7.14*** (2.12)	3.88 (2.88)	7.93*** (2.83)
Border cty across ste line	--	--	3.85 (4.57)
Constant	43.46*** (.470)	31.12*** (.468)	36.82*** (.549)

(continued) Table 4 **Spillover Effects for Campaign Visits**

Romney	Illinois	Missouri	Illinois and Missouri
Visit to county	2.31 (3.83)	12.51* (6.65)	6.25* (3.55)
Visit to border county	2.91 (2.46)	9.17** (3.87)	5.71*** (2.20)
Visit to border county across state line	--	--	6.92* (3.55)
Constant	25.69*** (.547)	23.50*** (.628)	24.41*** (.427)

Huckabee			
Visit to county	--	-8.60 (7.10)	-1.31 (7.87)
Visit to border county	--	3.90 (3.45)	11.19*** (3.77)
Visit to border county across state line	--	--	-9.48 (6.44)
Constant	--	38.10*** (.975)	30.81*** (.776)

Table 5

The Geographic Reach of Campaign Visits in Illinois and Missouri

Clinton	
Visit to county	-20.67***
	(6.56)
Visit to border County	-1.98
	(3.97)
Visit to border county across state line	-13.01*
	(7.49)
Visit to media market	2.92
	(2.16)
Constant	50.76***
	(1.01)

Obama	
Visit to county	24.19***
	(7.75)
Visit to border County	5.22
	(4.10)
Visit to border county across state line	13.52*
	(7.75)
Visit to media market	-1.79
	(2.22)
Constant	44.27***
	(1.04)

McCain	
Visit to county	7.3
	(5.56)
Visit to border County	3.05
	(3.03)
Visit to border county across state line	-1.03
	(4.61)
Visit to media market	5.72***
	(1.71)
Constant	35.98***
	(.58)

(continued) Table 5

The Geographic Reach of Campaign Visits in Illinois and Missouri

Romney	
Visit to county	4.51
	(3.60)
Visit to border County	3.97*
	(2.32)
Visit to border county across state line	5.18
	(3.60)
Visit to media market	2.25**
	(1.01)
Constant	23.91***
	(.48)

Huckabee	
Visit to county	-7.81
	(7.69)
Visit to border County	4.69
	(3.90)
Visit to border county across state line	-15.98**
	(6.35)
Visit to media market	8.18***
	(1.84)
Constant	29.13***
	(.84)

Challenging the Urban Growth Machine: The Role of Neighborhood Associations in Local Government

Tony E. Wohlers, Cameron University

Despite the numerous interest group studies, ambiguities remain, especially in relatively small urban communities with respect to the formation and influence of interest groups. Research suggests that a limited number of powerful economic groups in cooperation with local officials enjoy a privileged position and recognition in decision-making processes. From an anti-growth perspective, the literature also suggests the existence of local neighborhood groups able to counter these economic interests. Using the relatively small cities of Davenport, Iowa and Rock Island, Illinois, this study investigates the formation and influence of neighborhood associations in general and in the context of an urban growth coalition. Neighborhood associations form in response to threatening issues and the involvement of city governments to solve neighborhood issues. The effectiveness of such groups depends on their activities and the organizational strength of the economic counterparts.

Introduction

Despite the numerous interest group studies, ambiguities remain, especially in relatively small urban communities with respect to the formation and influence of interest groups. Research suggests that a limited number of powerful economic groups in cooperation with local officials enjoy a privileged position and recognition in decision-making processes. From an anti-growth perspective, the literature also suggests the existence of local neighborhood groups able to counter these economic interests. Using the relatively small cities of Davenport, Iowa and Rock Island, Illinois, this study investigates the formation and influence of neighborhood associations in general and in the context of an urban growth coalition. Neighborhood associations form in response to threatening issues and the involvement of city governments to solve neighborhood issues. The effectiveness of such groups depends on

their activities and the organizational strength of the economic counterparts.

Theoretical Background

Changes in and the development of the urban landscape result from concerted efforts by growth coalitions (Holupka & Shlay, 1993). The urban growth machine literature recognizes the privileged position of economic groups in local government and concerns the "process through which goods and services actually come to be distributed in the society" (Molotch, 1976, p. 313). The urban regime literature also investigates arrangements between private interests and governmental officials in the area of economic growth (Stone, 1989; Elkins, 1995). According to Stephen Elkin (1987), city officials form close relations with business interests because they "are interested in the economic performance of the industries that operate within their borders and attracting new investment" (Elkin, 1987, p. 7). These policy and economic interests form a partnership to retain power over economic development or ensure such development.

While Paul Peterson (1981) views the role of public officials as pointless in the growth coalition, he, along with David Marsh (1983) and David Elkins (1995), agrees with the dominant position of economic interests over non-economic interests in local economic development. The urban research literature not only investigates the historical development of neighborhood organizations but it also acknowledges the increasing influence of such groups (Bell & Force, 1956**;** Williams, 1985; Cunningham & Kotler, 1983; Haeberle, 1989; Sampson, 1991; Richardson & Jordan 1979; Berry, Portney & Thomson, 1993; Silver, Weitzman & Brecher, 2002; Fischel, 2003). Defined as a non-profit and civic organizations with formal organizational structures in a small territory, urban neighborhood associations mobilize citizens and expose them to a wide range of policy issues (Crenson, 1978; Henig, 1982; Cunningham & Kotler, 1983; Logan & Rabrenovic, 1990; Ferman, 1996).

Neighborhood groups do not emerge by accident. Contrary to the traditional belief, Abraham Wandersman et al. (1987) claim social psychological variables and cost and benefit considerations as significant factors predicting citizen participation in neighborhood groups. Factors that contribute to the emergence of neighborhood associations include the participatory mentality of *gentrifiers* or *joiners* in urban communities, the urban drug war, and the promotion of such groups by the local governments and federal programs (Haeberle, 1989; Mesch & Schwirian, 1996). Others argue that threatening land-development projects, the emergence of other neighborhoods groups and the availability of federal funds stimulate the formation of neighborhood associations (Henig, 1982; Schneider & Teske, 1993; Logan & Rabrenovic, 1990). Finally, the homogeneity of interests, the frequency with which local groups interact and the threat of a development project overcome Mancur Olson's collective action problem and, thus, ease the emergence of such groups (Schneider & Teske, 1993; Thomas, 1986; Knickmeyer, Hopkins & Meyer, 2003).

As they mobilize, emerge and mature, neighborhood groups deal with a great variety of issues, including new housing developments, crime prevention strategies, and ways to improve streets and schools. "They are intrinsically multi-issue groups [which] does not mean that they are not focused on one or two issues at any time" (Berry, Portney & Thomson, 1993, p 169). While the degree of issues representation remains debatable, neighborhood groups influence policymaking to promote their issues (Swindell, 2000). Popular strategies to promote issues range from the dissemination of information to public officials and the lobbying of elected officials to the organization of public rallies and the identification of candidates for public office (Williams, 1985; Henig, 1982; Cunningham & Kotler, 1983; Ferman, 1996)

In addition to promoting issues, neighborhood groups also block threatening issues. This claim implies that certain issues do not survive the policymaking process or remain totally detached from that process. By relying on different theoretical perspectives, the study on community power offers a more comprehensive understanding of issue blocking. Hunter's Community Power

Structure (1953) argues that an economic elite is able to impose its will on the community and, thus, controls it. As illustrated by his case study of Atlanta, the economic elite shares certain types of decisions and is able to determine which issue shall receive attention from policymakers (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1959). Pluralists like Dahl (1961) and others argue that power is diffused throughout many parts of the political system, which allows for the free competition between ideas and interests. Within this system of dispersed authority, public demands and opinions drive policy processes.

By enhancing Schattschneider's (1960) mobilization of bias theory and developing the notion of non-decision-making, Bachrach and Baratz (1962; 1963; 1970) challenge the pluralistic view and lay the foundations for the neo-elitist interpretation of power. Equivalent to the blocking of issues, non-decision-making conveys the idea that a local elite is able to prevent the emergence of unfriendly issues "by manipulating the dominant community values, myths and political institutions and procedures" (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, p. 632). As illustrated by Matthew Crensons's (1971) study on the "un-politics of air pollution," this *restrictive form of power* limits the scope of agendas, where "some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out" (E. E. Schattschneider, in Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, p. 949).

While the dominant political climate in Gary and East Chicago described by Crenson (1971) explains non-decision-making, concrete strategies to block issues are obscured. Therefore, Roger Cobb and Marc Ross (1997) discuss a series of low-, medium-, and high-cost blocking strategies useful to both economic and non-economic interests at the local level. Ignoring and denying problems as well as defining them as unique are the major low-cost strategies. Medium-cost strategies seek to discredit the substantive issue and the issue initiator by, among others, disputing the logic of issues, creating negative stereotypes, and using deception. If these strategies fail, symbolic placation is a means to block the consideration of proposed solutions. Finally, high-cost strategies include electoral sanctions, legal actions, arrest, imprisonment and

organized violence. Strategies do not necessarily breed success in influencing city hall.

Gustavo Mesch and Kent Schwirian (1996) uncover a series of factor that determine the effectiveness of neighborhood groups. Their socioeconomic status and the ability of such groups to both mobilize resources and link with other neighborhood-based groups strengthen their perceived influence in local policymaking. Despite these factors, there is no conclusive evidence to determine the effectiveness of neighborhood groups in policymaking. William Fischel (2003) considers neighborhood associations as "active and effective watchdogs of municipal affairs" (p. 279). While Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney and Ken Thomson (1993) and other scholars generally concur, the effectiveness of neighborhood depends on the policy area. In the context of zoning policies, Brian Green and Yda Schreuder (1991) suggest that community groups' opposition to upzoning reduces the effectiveness of the growth elite. At this same time, however, the authors note that "community participation in the form of support of zoning applications…does not appear sufficient to effect outcome" (Green & Schreuder, 1991, p. 109).

Research Design

Because of their proximity, governmental structures and small size, the cities of Davenport, Iowa and Rock Island, Illinois serve as suitable case studies to investigate the formation and influence of neighborhood groups and their interactions with public officials and economic interests in the context of the urban growth coalition paradigm. Given their proximity along the Mississippi River, both cities continue to share similar political and economic experiences. Governed by different government structures, the mayor-council system in Davenport and the council-manager model in Rock Island are the dominant local government types across the United States (Svara, 1999; Wilson & Dilulio, 2004). While each of the cities is relatively small, Davenport and Rock Island are part of a major metropolitan area with a combined population of approximately 142,000 as of 2000. This metropolitan status ensures

a diversity of policy issues and the existence of an active interest group community.

The data collection for this study relied on thirty-two semi-structured interviews with public officials in city hall, presidents and members of several neighborhood groups, and representatives of various economic interest groups in both cities. The major questions inquired about the emergence, activities, strategies and perceived influence of neighborhood groups. Qualitative coding served as the primary tool to analyze the interview transcripts, while content analysis was employed to analyze the relevant newspaper articles and government documents related to neighborhood groups and their issues. The coding units for this study were sentences and paragraphs, which referred to activities of and interactions among the public officials and local interest groups. Following the idea of domain analysis, as suggested by J. Spradley (1979), the development of the main coding categories for this study were grounded within the interview data. Following Klaus Krippendorff's (1980) discussion of content analysis, the actual content analyses proceeded manually by scanning the major local newspaper, the Davenport's Quad City Times and the Rock Island's Argus, for the past eight years.

Findings

Formation, Strategies and Perceived Influence of Neighborhood Groups

Several neighborhood groups exist in both cities. Some of the most active and organized neighborhood groups and mostly operating in the older parts of Davenport are the *Goose Creek Heights* and *LeClaire Heights* neighborhood associations. There are also the *Broadway* and *KeyStone* neighborhood groups in Rock Island (City of Rock Island, 1996; City of Rock Island, 1992; City of Davenport, 1996a; City of Davenport 1996b). These neighborhood groups possess formal organizational structures, adhere to regular meeting schedules and encourage residents to become active participants during policymaking. By educating their members about neighborhood problems through the dissemination of regular

newsletters and postcards, neighborhood groups have succeeded in involving citizens in city politics. The president of *KeyStone* explains: "We have educated people in the neighborhood, who call city hall if they see problems. Nine years ago, it was kind of ignorance and apathy. But I think we have overcome that by making people more powerful to contact a city person if they have a problem."

With the purpose of revitalizing and preserving the character of their neighborhoods, many of these neighborhood groups have emerged in response to the economic downturn of the 1980s in the cities of Rock Island and Davenport. In addition, both cities have encouraged the formation of neighborhood groups throughout the 1990s. Created in 1998 as an umbrella organization, *Neighborhood Partners* in Rock Island prioritizes problems through task forces and provides representatives of more than ten different neighborhood groups the opportunity to meet with representatives from city government. On a regular basis, delegates from neighborhood groups and city departments (e.g. police, fire, public works and economic development) interface and discuss neighborhood issues during formal meetings organized by *Neighborhood Partners*.

Similar to Rock Island, Davenport fostered partnership with neighborhood organizations during the late 1990s to deal with the effects of the economic downturn of the 1980s. Because of the loss of retail, jobs and population, Davenport experienced a shift of population from the city's urban core, the *East Davenport Neighborhoods*, to the suburban fringe at the edge of the city. In response, elected officials and citizens in Davenport facilitated the creation of a nearly citywide operating organization to provide a forum for several neighborhood groups active in the city's urban core to interact with one another. Like the *Neighborhood Partners* in Rock Island, the *East Davenport Development Corporation* in Davenport continues to function as a grassroots input source during policymaking by bringing neighborhood groups and policymakers together.

As one of the first cities in the State of Illinois, Rock Island initiated and coordinated partnerships with the localized neighborhood groups in the community during the early 1990s. The

goal was to provide assistance to each neighborhood group with the design and implementation of formal planning processes. Looking for guidance to its neighbor on the other side of the Mississippi to identify and solve neighborhood problems, Davenport pursued similar efforts a few years later. As illustrated by the 1996 *KeyStone* planning process in Figure 1, by involving citizens and public officials, the implementation of planning processes provides the foundations for identifying neighborhood issues and eventually linking them directly with city hall.

Figure 1. Planning Process of the *KeyStone Neighborhood Group*

Despite some overlaps, the number and scope of issues identified through the planning process vary, encompassing a list of nineteen to fifty-one prioritized items for the most active neighborhood groups in both cities (City of Davenport, 1996a; City of Davenport 1996b; City of Rock Island, 1996; City of Rock Island,

1992). Neighborhood groups like *LeClaire Heights* and *Goose Creek Heights* used planning processes to prioritize problems specific to their neighborhoods in 1996. Concerns addressed the infrastructure within the neighborhoods, crime, and abandoned vehicles in the streets, crowded schools and a deteriorating housing stock. Identified in 1991, the *Broadway* neighborhood group also prioritized issues like trash in yards, demolition of houses, abandoned houses, slum landlords, housing code violations and vacant buildings. Finally, some of the major issues identified by the *KeyStone* neighborhood group include the need to fix curbs, sidewalks, streets and boulevards, security and crime and deteriorating homes and vacant business in certain areas of the neighborhood.

The neighborhood groups in both cities have become an integral part of policymaking. Neighborhood groups rely on a range of strategies to learn about policy issues and subsequently promote those they deem important. Neighborhood groups have monitored policymaking at various levels of local government and established issue task forces. Both of these activities provide opportunities to neighborhood groups to learn about issues in particular policy areas. To monitor policymaking, neighborhood associations send *observers* to different local government units. Compared to making presentations and speaking before elected officials, this strategy is mostly passive but an effective form of participation in policymaking. On a regular basis, the *KeyStone* neighborhood group has pursued this form of participation by sending *observers* to meetings of the city council, the Preservation Commission, the Planning Commission and the Board of Zoning Appeals.

In addition to monitoring policy issues, neighborhood groups also form task forces to follow the city's progress in a given policy area that affect the neighborhoods. The formation of issue task forces allow neighborhood groups to focus on a range of issues at the same time, including property values, crime and safety, environmental issues and infrastructure concerns. Representatives of issue task forces contact individual council members and appear before the council to express their neighborhood concerns. A council proceeding summary includes the following about an issue

task force associated with *KeyStone*. "Ann Keefe spoke to Council as a representative of the *KeyStone Neighborhood* and the *Corridor Task Force*. She stated that the Capital Improvement Plan did not contain anything about the narrowing of Seventh Avenue, and she talked about the deteriorating housing, the criminal activities and other things that are occurring" (City of Rock Island, 2003b).

To promote their issues, several leading representatives of neighborhood organizations have succeeded in becoming members of the respective city councils. From that position of direct access to the center of decision-making, they are able to establish a direct link between their own neighborhood agenda and that of the city. By supplying their representatives on the council with the relevant issues, neighborhood groups influence issue salience through their council members. One neighborhood group representative, who serves on the council, notes: "When this plan was done, certain issues were identified by the neighborhood group. This is my plan and these are my goals I have to accomplish on the city council." In addition, neighborhood groups in both cities continue to lobby elected officials by appearing before the city councils and contacting individual public officials.

By serving on the city council, representatives of neighborhood groups are able to build a direct link between the issues considered at the neighborhood level and those considered at the council level. The role of neighborhood groups in bringing issues forward demonstrates the effectiveness of this linkage. Some council members view themselves as conduits between the council and the neighborhood groups. The result is an issue nexus between neighborhood groups and City Hall. A council member explains accordingly: "I help facilitate neighborhood groups and help them with their visions and support them to achieve their specific goals. As you build those needs, a list is then generated. Those needs are then passed up to the city council level either for a public policy, public funding or police protection."

In the context of these developments, influential members of neighborhood groups, who are not a part of the central policymaking circle in City Hall, sense an improved influence of neighborhood groups on issue salience. In the words of the

KeyStone President: "So, I think we were very happy when one of our *KeyStone* board members was willing to step forward and wanted to be on the city council. That was a good way to make neighborhood issues a top priority for the city." Asking the President whether the direct access to decision-making through their representative has made a difference, he quickly responds: "I see the council more open for neighborhood issues."

Many of the public officials also agree that neighborhood group representation on the city council and their members' active participation during council meetings (speeches, presentation of data and signed petitions) contribute to their influence in policymaking. In addition, the organization of public meetings by neighborhood groups to discuss and evaluate issues often gains the attention of public officials. Many council members view such public meetings as a birthplace of issues. A council member explains: "I have the opportunity to visit and to attend many neighborhood meetings. Almost upon every request, I am there, trying to work with the neighbors, not to dictate how I would do it. I view them as a resource and I visit them to get to know their concerns." In many cases, the emerging issues find their way into City Hall and rise to a prominent position among policymakers.

A comparison of the annual goal-setting sessions and their results in Davenport and Rock Island demonstrate the policymakers' concerns with building strong and livable neighborhoods. Table 1 illustrates that the issue of neighborhood vitality has remained a constant issue during the annual goal-setting sessions in Davenport. In contrast to Davenport, the goal-setting sessions in Rock Island in the years of 1999 and 2000 did not explicitly rank any neighborhood issue. Beginning with the goal-setting session of 2001, Rock Island ranks the revitalization of neighborhoods as a citywide goal. The repeated appearance of neighborhood issues during goal setting in recent years coincides with the increasing number of neighborhood representatives in both cities, especially in Rock Island.

Table 1: The Ranking of Neighborhood Issues, 1998-2004

	Davenport	Rock Island
Annual Goal Setting	Ranking	
2003-2004	--	5 (5)
2002-2003	3 (6)	2 (5)
2001-2002	3 (6)	5 (5)
2000-2001	3 (5)	--
1999-2000	3 (5)	--
1998-1999	7 (8)	--

Gambling in Rock Island

That neighborhood groups have influence in city hall is evident but whether this influence remains or fades in the context of an urban growth coalition is another question. A major issue among public officials in Rock Island concerns the controversial expansion of a sand and gravel operation by the *RiverStone* Group. Formerly known as *Moline Consumers*, the company has mined the rich sand deposits around Rock Island for more than fifty years, moving counterclockwise around the Illinois 92 and Interstate 280 interchange. Claiming a 1985 easement from the conservancy district, *RiverStone* wants the City of Rock Island to annex land near Interstate 280 and Illinois 92 and allow the company to mine and to operate a processing plant. For those currently involved, the request by *RiverStone*, which was expected in 2003 but officially occurred in early 2004, is a deja-vu. In 1991, *Moline Consumers* proposed similar plans. Organized opposition in the affected neighborhood emerged in response and just one year later the Rock Island County zoning commission rejected the plan.

As with *RiverStone*'s original mining plans, the proposed operation would create a new mining site close to the Big Island neighborhood. Stretching from the Rock River south to the South Slough and east from the Mississippi River, this neighborhood lies both within the city of Rock Island and unincorporated Rock Island

County. In contrast to the early 1990s, an attractive economic development carrot is in the mix for the city if the current project proceeds. Mining the new site allows *RiverStone* to abandon its current operation in southwest Rock Island and sell that property to *Jumer's Casino Rock Island*. As the smallest of the Quad-Cities' three Mississippi River gaming boats, the Rock Island casino, anchored along the city's downtown riverfront, has been contemplating business expansion at that very mining site for many years. A spokesperson for the Rock Island casino praised the site as "the greatest opportunity to create the product that we want to create, which would serve our needs best…as well as creating revenue for the city" (Turner, 2000, A2).

Despite some fluctuation, the taxed gaming revenues have benefited the city of Rock Island since the arrival of the gaming boat in 1992. Following a steep rise of gaming revenues between 1992 and 1995, revenues plunged between 1996 and 1999. For these years, the city did not budget any gaming revenues. This fiscally disappointing trend for both the casino and the city brightened up soon. Gaming revenues have steadily increased with the passage of dockside gaming by the Illinois State legislature in the spring of 1999, which meant that the casino no longer had to leave the dock or limit boarding hours to certain hours. Since the passage of the legislation, gaming revenues have not only increased, but also surpassed those of the early 1990s. Peaking at approximately $510,000 in 2000, gaming revenues have dropped to about $470,000 in 2002. Since the revenue turnaround the casino boat has contributed several million dollars to the city coffers, allowing 2002 expenditures of $4.24 millions from gaming revenues for capital improvement and economic development projects.

Supported by the Illinois Quad City Chamber of Commerce, the casino is currently planning a $90 million casino relocation and hotel project in southwest Rock Island. Supporters of the casino expansion in and around City Hall argue that the project will spur economic growth by creating hundreds of employment opportunities and encouraging commercial and residential developments in that area. The casino and the city will benefit. Capturing a larger market, the expanded mode of the casino will

increase the casino's profits and "double the city's annual gambling revenue." Another public official reiterates: "We have to be responsible to the taxpayers of our community by not closing the door on an economic development project that could generate an additional two to three millions dollars for the city." Given the fiscal calamities, the slowly recovering economy and Rock Island's success in revitalizing its downtown, the proposed opening of a new mining site by *RiverStone* and the possible transformation of the Rock Island casino into a larger bonanza are appealing to the political and economic stakeholders. However, not everybody agrees.

In response to the controversial mining expansion, numerous groups at the local and state level have emerged in opposition. The Big Island Soil and Water Preservation Committee (henceforth: Big Island group) is the most vociferous grassroots organization in the Big Island neighborhood and familiar with the issue at hand. On the initiative of a resident, the Big Island neighborhood group already formed in 1991 to organize residents' opposition to *Moline Consumers*' plan to open the same mining site. Because of several crossovers, such as an attorney and liaison officer, the Big Island group is closely linked to the Big Island River Conservancy District, which was created in 1967 as a way to secure federal funding for a flood control system. Following the completion of the levee system in 1988, this special district is responsible for maintaining the levee system that protects Big Island and Milan.

The Big Island group and the Conservancy District are the major stakeholders with direct and economic interest in the outcome. Other groups have also emerged in opposition to the project. The Rock Island Preservation Club, the Quad City Audubon Society, the Quad City Conservation Alliance, the Illinois Stewardship Alliance, the Eagle View Group of the Sierra Club and the Mississippi River Basin Alliance fight the project on mostly environmental grounds. In contrast to the Big Island Group and *RiverStone*, these conservation interests have played a minor role. Based on content analysis of the relevant news articles, Figure 2 illustrates the dominant role of *RiverStone* and the citizen group in Big Island compared with other stakeholders during the public debate between 2003 and 2004.

Figure 2: The Level of Activity by Stakeholders–*RiverStone*, 2003-04

     The Big Island group is the largest and best-organized neighborhood group in opposition to the project. Like *RiverStone*, the Big Island group has assembled a team of experts versed in legal, engineering and real estate matters. Claiming to speak on behalf of the 170 families living in Big Island, a spokeswoman for the Big Island group seeks to undermine the feasibility of the mining relocation issue, arguing that the levee system is not designed to withstand the mining site within it. In addition, the mining site threatens the quality of drinking water, increases the risk of losing benefits from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, impedes the orderly growth of residential development and decreases property values (City of Rock Island, 2003b). The group's standpoint is clear to all. A public official, who acknowledges the controversial nature of this issue, notes: "I certainly think there are issues pending now where there would be those who want that to happen. That group from Big Island would like to see this whole project in the southwest area stopped..."

     Citizen groups rely on a variety of visible strategies to prevent the emergence of viable issues, which they perceive as threatening to their neighborhood. They devise strategies to

illuminate their opposition to issues within the wider community and among the policymakers. As soon as the Big Island group learned of the potential relocation of the mining operation in the spring of 2003, they began to raise money and organize a public anti-issue campaign months before the issue had formally reached City Hall. As mentioned, representatives of this citizen group enumerated and made public a series of technical reasons in the media to undermine the feasibility of the proposed mining site. Moreover, they expressed their opposition and sought support by organizing a public campaign and appealing directly to the members of the city council.

The Big Island group placed more than 1,000 *Save Big Island* yard signs throughout the Quad Cities during the spring of 2003. It recently added three billboards in Rock Island and Milan, Rock Island's neighbor to the south, describing Big Island as *a great place to live and play.* Leading representatives of the Big Island group have also encouraged Big Island residents to appear before council and make emotional appeals to the policymakers. In early spring 2003, a six-year-old boy, along with his mother and father, read a letter to the mayor and council stating that the proposed gravel pit would interfere with the children's existing playground (City of Rock Island, 2003a). In addition, representatives of this group have appeared before the city council to reiterate the safety, legal and scientific concerns if the city grants the special mining permit.

Besides these overt issue blocking campaigns, the Big Island group has pursued other strategies: organizing coalitions, swaying individual council members and alluding to possible legal actions. Over several months, the Big Island group has organized an anti-issue coalition, consisting of policymakers at the state level and representatives from the relevant local interest groups. Representatives of this multi-level coalition have come forward to oppose the proposed mining site, citing the 1992 rejection by the Rock Island County zoning commission and pointing to the adverse impacts of the proposed mining site on the neighborhood. State legislators have agreed to write letters to council members in which they expressed their opposition and members of the Rock Island

Conservation Club Board have expressed their contention (City of Rock Island, 2003a).

The Big Island group has also exerted pressure on the local officials by directly swaying council members and assessing the legality of the economic development project. The Big Island group invited council members to participate in an organized tour of their neighborhood. The well-organized tour focused on those areas that would be affected mostly if mining were to take place. One of the council members, who took the tour, recalls: "Then later [Big Island] approached individual council members…They took us for a ride and talked to people. We went into a couple of houses that were nice and would be spoiled. A well-planned effort." Recently, the Big Island group and the Big Island River Conservancy District have publicly announced a meeting with their attorney to discuss possible legal actions to prevent the relocation of the mining site.

Revitalizing Davenport

Public officials in Davenport acknowledge and emphasize the influence of economic interests. In recent years, leading economic interests in Davenport have succeeded in building a successful growth coalition. It began with reorganization and a series of fundraising efforts and continued with networking. Similar to the emergence of *Renaissance Rock Island*, the principal economic group to foster downtown revitalization during the early 1990s in Rock Island, Davenport also witnessed the formation of such an organization. In 2000, the Davenport Chamber of Commerce, Rejuvenate Davenport, the Downtown Davenport Development Corporation, Downtown Davenport Association and the Davenport Central City Partnership merged into *DavenportOne*.

Not long after the merger, *DavenportOne* made good on its mandate to foster economic growth in the community by proclaiming goals and raising financial resources. Not surprisingly, the major goals emphasized business and workforce attraction, community image enhancement, leadership development, government action and downtown redevelopment. In January 2001, *DavenportOne* launched the so-called *D1 Initiative*, a successful multi-million fundraising campaign to buy land and facilitate economic and community development in Davenport. Within a

relatively short period, numerous residents and local and national businesses pledged several millions of dollars, surpassing the organization's original goal. The City of Davenport joined the efforts. According to a memorandum by the finance department, *DavenportOne* received $100,000 and $50,000 in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, respectively. Three more payments in the amount of $50,000 will be made by the city in fiscal years 2005, 2006 and 2007.

Currently, drawing on 1,300 members and an operating budget of $2.8 million dollars, *DavenportOne* has the ability to influence issues in City Hall. Over the years, *DavenportOne* has supported pro-growth candidates during elections. A council member remembers: "*DavenportOne* is a well organized and structured group and I think they influence not only elected officials but also the direction of the city and they use the money to do so…They have a political action committee group. So, in the last election members of *DavenportOne* donated money to pro-development candidates and they are likely to do this again." The reports filed by local candidates between 2001 and 2004 with the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board illustrate the link between economic interests and City Hall. Organizations and individuals associated with *DavenportOne* have made repeated campaign contributions, but exclusively to those emphasizing pro-growth policies in the 2001 and 2003 elections.

In addition to these mechanisms, *DavenportOne* has also fostered close ties to the media, several banks, energy providers, small and mid-sized private businesses and many other economic interest groups at the local, state and national levels. Some of the most notable members on the board of directors of *DavenportOne* include KWQC-TV6, Lee Enterprises, Quad City Bank and Trust, US Bank, Ruhl and Ruhl Realtors, MidAmerican Energy Company, Downtown Partnership and the Riverboat Development Authority. Primarily through its ties with KWQC-TV6, Lee Enterprises, Wells Fargo, the Riverboat Development Authority and the assets they control, *DavenportOne* has succeeded in the formation and maintenance of a pro-growth coalition core (see Table 2). This coalition has been able to keep the River Renaissance on the Mississippi project on the policy agenda.

Table 2: *DavenportOne* and the Pro-Growth Coalition Core

Organization	DavenportOne Affiliation	Local Affiliation
KWQC-TV6	Directorship	Local TV station and owned by Young Broadcasting Incorporated
Lee Enterprises	Vice Chairmanship	Owner of the Quad City Times - circulation 53,872
Wells Fargo, Iowa	Past Chairmanship	Oversees the banking and financial services in the Quad Cities
Riverboat Developt Authority	Directorship	Sponsoring organization for the riverboat in Davenport

Financed through state, county, city and private donations, the $113.5 million River Renaissance project is Davenport's response to a deteriorating downtown. In 2000, state legislators approved a major community attractions fund, known as the Vision Iowa Program. The actual financial realization of River Renaissance began in spring 2001 when *DavenportOne* and city officials applied for funding from the Vision Iowa Program. Set out to support communities in their endeavors to attract major attractions costing more than $20 million, the state program was essential to the realization of the River Renaissance project. Endorsed by the mayor and the majority of the city council, the current project envisions the construction of the AgTech Venture Capital Center, Figge Arts Center, River Music History Center, Skybridge to the Rhythm City Casino and many other amenities in the downtown area.

As River Renaissance began to unfold in 2000, *DavenportOne* has taken on a leadership role on the issue by publicly advocating River Renaissance on numerous occasions and providing the necessary resources to do so. Based on the content

analysis of newspaper articles between 2000 and 2004, *DavenportOne* was the primary organization involved in River Renaissance. Based on the frequency of public statements about River Renaissance, other economic interest organizations, citizen groups and public officials were hardly noticeable (see Figure 3). Many of the public officials agree. "*DavenportOne* was the synergy behind River Renaissance." Others concur and refer to the strengths of this organization. "*DavenportOne* spent considerable resources to ensure the passage of River Renaissance. No other group that I know of has the organizational strength and funding mechanisms to do so."

Figure 3: The Level of Activity by Stakeholder - River Renaissance, 2000-2004

The leadership role and resources of *DavenportOne* became particularly important when public resistance formed in opposition to River Renaissance. Following the conclusion of the application process for funding, Scott County promised an additional $5.26 million in bond funding, thereby increasing property taxes on a $100,000 home by $5.12 a year and on a 160-acre farm by $13.10 a year. In response, the Vision Iowa board, in charge of a $225 million fund, increased its original $15 million offer to $20 million in

August 2001; this increase sealed the deal for Davenport. While many public officials and economic interests hailed Vision Iowa as one of the most positive economic development initiatives to hit the city in decades, the possible tax increase and some ambiguities about the project were not welcomed by everybody. Citizens began circulating a petition to force the bond sale to the polls. They managed to gather 11,277 signatures – far more than the 7,057 required to hold the vote, thereby, according to public officials and *DavenportOne*, jeopardizing the funding for the entire project.

Opponents of the tax increase coalesced around the *Committee to Inform Scott County Voters.* This citizen group, led by a resident known as an active participant in local politics, disseminated and conveyed their criticism through the media. The group also maintained an internet site to tally the signature count in favor of holding the referendum. As the opposition organized, so did the acolytes of River Renaissance under the tutelage of *DavenportOne*. With the purpose of mobilizing support for the project through radio, television and newspaper advertisements and yard signs, *DavenportOne* facilitated the creation of the *Scott County Taxpayers for River Renaissance* in September 2001.

Created as a political action committee, the *Scott County Taxpayers for River Renaissance* consisted of a broad spectrum of individuals. The most prominent voices of this grassroots organization ranged from senior citizens and local government officials to representatives from religious organizations and educational institutions. Unlike the *Committee to Inform Scott County Voters,* the *Taxpayers for River Renaissance* political action committee was very successful in tapping monetary resources to fight the referendum and promote the River Renaissance project at the same time. Throughout its relative short life cycle of approximately five months, this political action committee, according to the reports filed with the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board, raised a total of $139,649.00 through cash contributions. Most of the money came from *DavenportOne*, banks, other political action committees and major businesses in the city.

Devoted to the passage of the referendum and the implementation of River Renaissance, *DavenportOne* was now in a

position to claim the existence of a resource-rich and broad pro-growth coalition and to promote River Renaissance through the media. In a newspaper article, the most outspoken supporter of River Renaissance, the president of *DavenportOne,* not only called for the continued need for downtown revitalization but also assured the readers of a "broad, deep and historic grass-roots coalition supporting the project…" (Tibbetts, 2001, A1). In addition to spending approximately $20,000 each for advertisements in the *Quad City Times* and yard signs, the *Scott County Taxpayers for River Renaissance* and *DavenportOne* purchased about $88,000 in television commercial time from *KWQC-TV6*. Soon, other efforts followed to stimulate and maintain a pro-growth momentum. Again, *DavenportOne* relied on the written word.

Aimed at influencing its immediate clientele, *DavenportOne* recommended a series of steps their member businesses can take to ensure the approval of the referendum. Published in the *Quad City Times*, shortly before the referendum *DavenportOne* asked the business community to mail letters to their customers and suppliers and to meet with their employees. The goal was to explain the benefits of the project and garner public support for the referendum. Other guidelines encouraged the implementation of an e-mail broadcast to get out the vote, the placement of *vote yes* yard signs throughout the city and the dissemination of campaign literature among employees, customers, suppliers and neighbors.

During the weeks leading to the referendum and after the coalition's victory in October 2001, many organizations continued to support downtown revitalization. Founded in 1989 as a non-profit organization qualified to sponsoring organizations for a riverboat in Davenport, the Riverboat Development Authority has emerged as one of the major allies of *DavenportOne* and grant-awarding entities in the community. For most of its existence, the Riverboat Development Authority has exclusively relied for income on the President Riverboat Casino (renamed the Rhythm City Casino in 2000) and is currently situated along Davenport's downtown riverfront. In addition, neighborhood organizations also came forward in support of *DavenportOne*. Representing the nearest

neighborhoods to the downtown development area, the *Friends of the Gold Coast* and the *Hamburg Historic District Homeowners Association* indicated their strong support of River Renaissance through editorials in the newspaper.

Conclusion

By focusing on the cities of Davenport, Iowa and Rock Island, Illinois, this study investigated the formation and influence of neighborhood groups in general and in the context of an urban growth coalition. The findings comport well with the observations made by the literature – neighborhood associations emerge and, for the most part, the growth coalition is alive and well. Despite their relatively small size, both cities have several well-organized and active neighborhood groups, which provide many opportunities for ordinary citizens to learn about, participate in and shape policymaking. As expected, some of the neighborhood groups emerge in response to threatening issues. Others, especially citywide neighborhood groups, emerge because the cities encourage and facilitate their formation. As they emerge and mature, neighborhood groups, in partnership with local government, identify and prioritize a wide range of issues through formal planning processes.

To become an integral part of policymaking, neighborhood groups rely on several strategies designed to learn about policy issues and subsequently promote some of them during the formal policymaking process in city hall. To learn about issues, neighborhood groups recruit some of their own members to observe policy discussions at different government units and form issue-specific task forces. By becoming members of the city council, neighborhood group representatives are able to link their issues to the agenda in City Hall. This link constitutes the most direct pathway leading to the rise of neighborhood issues on the policy agenda. Other strategies used by neighborhood groups to promote their issues include the active participation in regular council meetings and the organization of both neighborhood meetings and issue campaigns. Because of their active involvement in city politics,

leaders of neighborhood groups and elected officials view neighborhood associations as influential actors during policymaking. The repeated appearance of neighborhood issues during the annual goal setting sessions evidences this claim.

In the context of an urban growth coalition, influence in city politics depends on the level of activities with respect to both neighborhood groups and economic interests. Before the growth coalition is able to form an active and coherent block, successful neighborhood groups block threatening issues as soon as they emerge using low-, medium- and, to some extent, high-cost strategies. Often supported by local and state interest groups, neighborhood associations rely on several strategies to block issues. Strategies to mobilize citizens and exert pressure on City Hall are visible to the community and policymakers. They include the use of the media, the organization of public campaigns and the building of coalitions consisting of policymakers at the state level and local interest groups. To undermine development projects, neighborhood groups also make rational and emotional appeals to the policymakers during council meetings, invite individual council members to tour their neighborhood, and threaten legal actions.

Economic interests are important actors in Davenport with the ability to influence political and especially economic issues. The success of economic interests to influence policymaking depends not only on their ability to influence and win over public officials with pro-growth attitudes but also on their active and constant efforts to secure the realization of development projects. The visible formation of a successful pro-growth coalition may begin with organizational restructuring and public fundraising campaigns. Economic interests also establish ties with elected officials, the media, banks, neighborhood groups and other economic interests at the local and state levels. Through these emerging organizational networks, economic interests keep economic development projects on the policy agenda and mobilize support for such projects during critical times. The constant activities and dominating position of a well-organized growth coalition counter and diminish the emergence of any viable anti-growth coalition in the community.

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The Distribution of Federal Expenditures Among Rich and Poor Illinois Counties

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This paper explores American federal spending in Illinois counties. The primary findings are: (1) counties that benefit more from total federal spending on a per-capita basis tend to be poorer. Thus, the distribution of federal expenditures among counties in Illinois is progressively redistributive; (2) poor counties that receive more federal spending overall tend to benefit primarily from federal direct payment programs whereas rich counties benefit disproportionately from federal salaries and wages and to a lesser extent procurement contracts; (3) the spending advantage of poorer counties increased steadily from 1983 to 2001, and (4) counties that show greater vote support for Democratic candidates for president and senator tended to benefit more from federal spending than those that supported Republican candidates. We conclude by suggesting that comparative state research is needed on the extent to which higher levels of procurement and salaries and wages expenditures can offset the progressively redistributive effect of direct spending.

Introduction

Since Adam Smith (1776), the role of government in capitalist political economies has been understood as one of providing law and order, national defense, and public goods. In Smith, minimizing the role of government in the economy is another goal. Since the 1930s, correcting income inequality has been considered by many an appropriate goal of a national government (e.g., Page and Simmons, 2000). The problem is that Smith's roles and income redistribution may conflict and politics must resolve the

conflict. How it does so is the question explored in this paper by studying county-by-county federal spending in one state, Illinois. This paper is part of a larger ongoing project exploring the distribution of federal spending at the county level within all states in the United States. Here we ask how total federal expenditures are distributed among rich and poor Illinois counties, whether this distribution is consistent with the goal of equalizing wealth (i.e., poorer counties get more than richer ones), whether trends in county voting are related to federal spending, and whether Illinois might tell us something about how the federal government resolves conflicts between income inequality and Adam Smith's roles for government.

There are reasons to expect that federal spending might help poor areas. Page and Simmons (2000), Rawls (1971; 1993), and others provide utilitarian arguments for why government spending should compensate for the tendency for capitalist economies to create great income disparity. There are also arguments like Peterson's (1982; 1995) that the federal government can more efficiently redistribute wealth among states and localities while local governments should focus on local economic development. There is considerable precedent for progressive redistributive spending in American politics. Since the 1930s social security has been a major source of income for unemployed, injured, and older Americans. In the mid-1960s Great Society programs entitled poor Americans to Medicaid and older Americans to Medicare. In areas where there is little economic activity, these programs are major sources of income as well as major sources of growth in current national budgets.

There are also reasons why poor areas would not benefit. Friedrich Hayek (1960) and other economists (e.g., James M. Buchanan; 1975; Charles Wolf, 1988) argue that government should not interfere or at least should interfere minimally with the distribution of wealth. Apart from ideological and economic arguments against redistributive government spending, there are political reasons to believe that government spending would be regressively redistributive. Page and Simmons point out that the median voter in the electorate tends to be in the middle to slightly higher income brackets, and it this voter that politicians of both

major political parties seek to favor. As a result, federal spending should not be found to benefit the poor but rather to transfer wealth from rich and poor to the middle class (see also George Stigler's 1970 discussion of Director's Law). Studies of the geographic distribution of military procurement in the United States find that wealthier states tend to benefit more from this type of spending (Russett, 1970; Rundquist & Carsey, 2002). Other authors contend that the upper class and corporations benefit more (e.g., Lindblom, 1977). Lindblom's argument is that limited government leads incumbent politicians to use federal spending to induce corporations with such things as subsidies and tax cuts to provide employment and other societal necessities. In other kinds of political economies these would be provided directly by government.

Political parties traditionally line up on these questions, with Democrats arguing more for aid to the poor and Republican platforms favoring more defense spending and less government redistribution of income and regulation of the economy. Some political scientists address the Republican takeover of Congress in the 1990s. They argue that whether government is controlled by Democrats or Republicans (e.g., Aldrich, 1995; Rohde, 1991; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Stein & Bickers, 1997) will tend to produce different distributions of federal spending so that areas represented by Democrats before the Republican takeover of Congress in 1995 and areas represented by Republicans after 1995 should be found to benefit (Bickers & Stein, 2000). This may reflect both changes in the level at which programs for Democratic and Republican areas are funded as well as the killing of programs for Democratic constituencies and the creation of new programs for Republican constituencies.

Past research has attempted to track the sub-national distribution of federal expenditures, usually for particular types of programs, to states and congressional districts (e.g., Rundquist and Carsey, 2002). However, little research has examined the distribution of *total* federal spending among rich and poor counties. This study addresses four questions regarding federal spending in Illinois:

1. Do poor counties receive more federal expenditures than rich counties?
2. Is the distribution of federal expenditures between rich and poor counties stable over time?
3. What types of federal spending favor poor and rich counties and is this stable over time?
4. Is partisan vote support for candidates for national offices related to whether counties benefit from or are deprived by federal spending?

Methodology

To answer these questions we analyze county level data from the Commerce Department's Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), the Regional Economic Information System (REIS), and Congressional Quarterly's (CQ) on elections. The CFFR provides year-to-year data on federal program spending from 1983 to 2001. The REIS data on income are also year-to-year for the same period, and the CQ data cover presidential and senatorial elections from 1978 to 2001. All of the CFFR and REIS economic data are converted into 2000 constant dollars and per-capitized by dividing by county population.

We examine these data in three different ways. First, to determine which counties are rich and poor, we ranked Illinois' 102 counties by per capita income from highest to lowest (please contact the authors for a packet of tables and maps which detail the analyses summarized here). From 1983 to 2001, the average per capita income for counties in the top income quintile, we label them "rich counties," is $27,170; that for counties in the bottom income quintile, the "poor" counties, is $17,551. Counties in the top income quintile tend to be located in northern and central Illinois. Counties in the bottom income quintile tend to be located in southern and western Illinois.

To determine which counties receive the most and least federal expenditures we sum the amount of programmatic expenditures in each county for the whole 1983 to 2001 period. Counties are ranked from high to low on this measure. We identify

the top 20 counties as "winners" – i.e., those that receive the highest amounts of total per capita federal expenditures -- and the bottom 20 counties as "losers" – those that receive the lowest amounts of total per capita federal expenditures (see Table 1). Counties in the top quintile of federal spending averaged $6694 per capita; counties in the bottom quintile averaged $2925 per capita, or less than half the average for top quintile counties. Geographically, ten of the winner counties are south of Interstate 70. Ten of the loser counties are north of Interstate 80. Of the 54 counties between I-70 and I-80, the picture is mixed: ten are winners and ten are losers.

Second we analyze the level of per capita expenditures in all 102 counties for all 19 years (102 X 19 = 1938 county/years). In this analysis we ask whether the level of total federal spending per capita and various types of federal spending in county/years is associated with county wealth and party support in those county/years. This latter analysis is based on a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) statistical modeling of the cross-sectional time-series data (see Zellner, 1962; Greene, 2008). Party orientation is measured as the percentage of Republican votes for president and senator in elections from 1984 to 2000.

Types of federal programs are identified by the CFFR's object code. We include only the six program categories that represent spending outlays: direct payments to individuals for retirement and disability (DR), direct payments to individuals other than for retirement and disability (DO), direct payments other than to individuals (DX), grants (GG), procurement contracts (PC), and salaries and wages (SW). We omit the program categories that involve government assumption of private sector economic risk (i.e., insurance, guaranteed loans, and direct loans programs). Bickers and Stein (1991) refer to these latter programs as "contingent liability programs." Such programs may constitute benefits to local businesses by allowing them to assume more risk than they otherwise would, but whether the federal government spends money is contingent on events like floods, draughts, and the like. So the present analysis is only of programs for which the federal government actually makes outlays.

We analyze the relationship between wealth and spending using SUR due to its suitability to properly take into account the characteristics of our data (see Walker & Jackson, 2009 for another example of the use of SUR to analyze spending data).[2] We wish to examine both the relationship between total spending and wealth, and the relationships between the six individual program categories and wealth. It would be inappropriate to conduct seven separate panel regressions on each type of spending given that spending in each of the categories is related to spending in all the other categories and total spending (which is the total of all six program categories). Thus, the residuals of each equation would be correlated. SUR allows the estimation of all seven spending equations simultaneously and takes into account the correlation among the residuals of each equation.

The SUR model includes seven equations, one for each of the six types of federal spending and one for total federal spending. The seven equations are simultaneously estimated based on population, year, per capita income, percent Republican vote for president, and percent Republican vote for Senate. The number of federal and military jobs is also included in the equation for salaries and wages.[3] We did not include a lagged spending variable as a predictor of spending on the right hand side of each equation.[4] The

2 Using Stata, our SUR estimations uses Feasible Generalized Least Squares as expressed by Greene (2008); this should control for heteroskedastic errors.

3 Initially, we considered a model including dummy variables for presidential "party," House of Representatives "party" dominance, Senate "party" dominance, "president" dummy variables, and "divided government" dummy variables. We dropped the party and divided government variables because they were highly correlated with other variables with little change in R-squared. We dropped the "president" variables from the model due to the fact that the presidencies obviously occur chronologically. When regressed against all program spending, they were highly and spuriously correlated due to incremental budget increases.

4 There has been a lively debate in the government budgeting literature regarding whether lagged spending measures should be included when predicting spending. For our purposes, it is only

hypothesis regarding redistributive spending is that as per capita income increases in a county, federal spending in that county will decrease. The logic here is that wealthier counties need less federal assistance and/or investment. In order to examine partisan support, we constructed an imputed vote variable. For "President" and "Senate" vote we predict the programmatic outlays from the vote in the year of the previous election.[5] The assumption here is that counties that vote Republican in an election will be Republican (or at least more Republican than counties that vote Democratic) in years that follow the election.

Findings

On average, poor (bottom income quintile) counties tend to receive more federal spending than do rich (top income quintile) counties. As shown in Table 2, poor counties receive an average of $4743 per capita, while rich counties receive $3924 per capita. Statewide, across the 19 year time period, the relationship between income and federal spending is statistically significant and negative; higher per capita income is related to lower federal spending (see Table 3).

Because the numbers in Table 2 represent average expenditures and income for the top and bottom income quintile counties from 1983 to 2001, they may mask year-to-year variation in spending. Therefore, Figure 1 shows all program spending in top and bottom income quintile counties year-to-year from 1983 to 2001 (Figures 2 through 4 show individual program spending and will be discussed in the next section). Over time for all programmatic spending, poor counties consistently receive more federal spending

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necessary to state that we agree with Achen's (2000) conjecture that the incrementalism result is more often than not a statistical artifact and that including a lagged spending variable grossly and incorrectly distorts the statistical and substantive significance of other predictors in the model.

5 There are some shortcomings of this type of imputation. However, we could not use public opinion data or presidential approval at the county level for this analysis.

than do rich counties. The difference in federal spending between rich and poor counties grows fairly consistently between 1983 and 2001, favoring poor counties overall: In 1984, the difference was $502 per capita in favor of poor counties, and by 2001 the difference was $1822 in favor of poor counties (only 3 years show decreases in the difference).

Figures 2 through 4 detail the individual program spending patterns by income quintile over time. The pattern is quite clear – poor counties consistently receive more in the direct payment categories: DR, DO and DX. Moreover, the gap in direct expenditures between rich and poor counties increases over time. Poor counties also tend to do better than rich counties in grants spending, although here there is much greater variability over time.

Procurement contracts (PC) and salaries and wages (SW) are distinctly different. Figure 4 shows that the relationship between federal PC dollars per capita and per capita income has little discernable pattern for poor counties, but is relatively stable for rich counties. The over-time analysis of salaries and wages clearly shows that this spending category differs significantly from the others in that it favors rich counties over poor ones.[6]

The SUR regression analysis (see Table 3) demonstrates that county percentage vote for Republican presidential candidates has a negative relationship with spending in categories DR, DO, GG and SW, while there is a positive relationship with DX. The regression coefficient for presidential vote in the total program spending and PC equations does not achieve statistical significance. The coefficients for percent Republican vote for Senate show a negative relationship with spending in the PC, SW, DR and total spending equations, while it shows a positive relationship in the DX equation.

Thus in this multivariate context, both per capita income and party orientation are significant predictors of federal

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6 The gap between the two is overall smaller than is seen throughout the other program types; the average difference is only $118 in favor of top income quintile counties, with a range and variability of only $73 and $188.

expenditures.[7] The relationship between income and total program spending is negative which indicates that federal spending in Illinois is progressive—poorer counties get more than richer ones. Percent Senate vote yields a significant coefficient (-34.02), while year also has a significant coefficient (113.77); counties with higher levels of Republican voting tend to receive lower levels of total federal expenditures.

The overall relationship between direct spending (DR, DO, and DX) and income is also negative and fairly consistent (-.04, -.03 and -.03) – richer counties get less in these expenditure categories. This is not the case with the other types of federal spending. There is only a slightly negative relationship between per capita income and GG spending (it failed to achieve significance), and a positive relationship between per capita income and SW spending. Salaries and wages is the only category in which higher income counties receive significantly *more* expenditures than lower income counties. PC spending in rich and poor counties varies wildly over time. With regard to other variables in the spending equations, year has a predictably positive effect – per capita spending in most program types increased over time. Also, county support for Democratic candidates has a positive effect on most types of spending, although different voting variables are significant for different types of spending.

To summarize, the SUR model shows basically two things. First, total federal expenditures are biased in favor of poorer rather than richer counties. Second, the richer counties benefit slightly more from salary and wages, rich and poor counties generally break even in terms of grants and procurement contracts, while poorer counties benefit much more overall and from the three categories of direct payments. It is also important to note that although in this parsimonious model wealth and party identification are significant predictors of federal spending and they account for a good deal of

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7 We also ran an SUR model with lagged spending variables as predictors of spending. As Achen (2000) predicts, the R-squares for each equation approached 1 and the statistical and substantive effects of all other variables were wiped out.

the variance in spending over time, other factors that may affect federal spending within the state are not considered in this analysis.

DISCUSSION

This exploration of federal spending in Illinois reveals the following:

1. There is considerable variation in federal spending across counties.
2. Poor counties average more federal spending than rich ones.
3. Poor counties not only receive more spending over the whole time period, but the difference between poor counties and rich ones increases steadily over time.
4. Counties that elect Democrats tend to receive more federal expenditures than counties that vote for Republicans.

So for Illinois, the answer to the question, does federal spending help poor counties, is yes. This study suggests that a combination of national and local politics has resolved the conflict over governmental goals in favor of equalizing the income distribution. The income distribution in Illinois is quite skewed in favor of the upstate urban and suburban counties around Chicago. But the federal government counters the mal-distribution of income with direct spending programs that benefit downstate counties. Perhaps this is facilitated by the tendency for people in poor counties to vote for Democrats.

Our study also leaves room for another explanation for the redistributive effect of federal spending in Illinois. In this view the redistributive pattern reflects what the federal government is *not* doing in the state. If the government *was* buying more weapons or training more troops here, Illinois would be receiving more federal expenditures overall and, to the extent that procurement and salaries and wages expenditures are distributed in a regressive fashion, overall federal spending might favor richer counties over poorer ones.

In terms of the scholarly studies of income inequality discussed earlier, our findings are more consistent with Page and Simmons and John Rawls utilitarian theories than with either Page and Simmons' empirical analyses or the normative arguments of Hayek, Buchanan, and Friedman, or Stigler's resurrection of Director's Law. Federal spending among Illinois counties is redistributive in the Robin Hood and not in the Robber Baron sense. However, as we have suggested, redistribution in Illinois may be due as much to the absence of some kinds of federal spending as to the presence of direct spending in poor areas. Although the effect of direct spending on the income distribution is hardly surprising, the instrumental effect of salaries and wages and procurement spending has not been emphasized in other studies of income inequality.

What might our findings suggest about the national politics that might have produced them? What we are probably observing is a tendency for New Deal and Great Society entitlement programs to target individuals in relatively poor counties while procurement contracts, most of which are military and reflect the Republican Party's and Conservative Coalition's agendas since World War II, target wealthier suburban areas that are capable of producing high tech military research and development and military equipment. Illinois traditionally has received less defense work (see Markusen et al., 1991) and therefore the balance in total federal spending is skewed toward entitlement spending, which advantages poorer counties. This may not be the case in other states like New Mexico and Florida, which have different economic landscapes in comparison to Illinois. If so this would mean that the redistributive effect of federal spending in a state is contingent on the composition of federal spending in the state.

Moreover, our finding that counties that tend to vote for Democrats tend to receive more direct expenditures and more federal expenditures overall suggests that partisan politics may play a causal role. Poor people vote for Democrats who maintain entitlement programs that provide direct expenditures. Similarly, Republican voters support politicians who support defense spending in their areas. Less defense work in Illinois than elsewhere in the U.S.

may therefore disadvantage Republican candidates for statewide office.

A study of additional states should indicate more about the truth of such conjectures. We should also explore whether the progressive redistribution of federal funds in Illinois reflects the concentration of population, income, and economic activity in one city and county– Chicago and Cook.. Expanding the analysis to states that vary in their concentration of population and economic activity would allow an examination of this possibility. Second, since it is also possible that our redistributive finding is specific to the Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton administrations of the 1980s and 1990s, analysis should be extended into the George W. Bush administration to determine whether the advantage of poorer counties contracted or continued to widen after 2000.

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Table 1. Total Per Capita Federal Expenditure Top and Bottom Quintile Counties

County	DR	DO	DX	GG	PC	SW	Total
Top quintile							
Gallatin	2437	1082	924	728	9710	199	15078
Schuyler	2091	1221	113	8776	110	643	12954
Calhoun	2173	1144	586	603	3221	255	7981
Pulaski	2483	1424	249	1879	1081	341	7457
Franklin	2891	1071	128	555	1845	248	6736
Rock Island	2253	899	60	392	556	2355	6515
Saline	2259	943	38	800	555	1717	6312
Alexander	2521	1283	153	1850	130	218	6155
White	2633	1097	452	724	989	201	6097
Carroll	2558	843	700	330	427	1183	6041
Williamson	2349	872	42	470	1244	791	5769
Sangamon	2767	1156	129	698	595	244	5589
McLean	2336	1101	180	583	1131	160	5492
Hamilton	2308	1127	757	532	286	218	5227
Pope	2046	906	328	645	555	735	5214
Pike	2269	995	620	637	457	212	5190

Vermilion	2385	931	214	462	437	724	5153
St. Clair	2207	998	1286	270	84	236	5081
Ford	2454	969	833	272	217	193	4939
Shelby	1959	844	712	849	320	209	4893
Avg.	**2369**	**1045**	**425**	**1103**	**1197**	**554**	**6694**
Bottom quintile							
Whiteside	2005	731	318	295	67	165	3580
Kane	1328	589	35	207	1022	321	3503
Winnebago	1715	647	49	347	498	226	3481
Douglas	1642	630	559	286	79	161	3357
Monroe	1789	601	282	302	230	119	3323
Macon	1535	877	303	301	92	183	3292
Coles	1680	819	201	332	66	148	3246
Grundy	1713	661	283	312	101	165	3235
Clinton	1755	657	189	262	116	142	3121
Tazewell	1757	704	103	281	127	146	3118
Jersey	1588	695	275	306	38	126	3028
Ogle	1578	557	405	178	99	163	2979

Madison	1345	597	268	298	67	269	2844
Woodford	1469	605	331	170	31	112	2718
DeKalb	1278	622	235	255	48	136	2574
Boone	1373	539	237	181	136	99	2564
DuPage	1265	494	12	150	215	315	2451
Will	1184	473	39	207	151	103	2157
Macoupin	1234	468	54	116	70	148	2089
Kendall	998	313	177	124	80	143	1835
Avg.	**1512**	**614**	**218**	**245**	**167**	**169**	**2925**

Table 2. Average Per Capita Federal Expenditure for Top and Bottom Income Quintile Counties

County	Income	DR	DO	DX	GG	PC	SW	Total
Top quintile								
Lake	38773	1296	516	13	211	363	1675	4074
DuPage	38768	1265	494	12	150	215	315	2451
Cook	29622	1652	1072	48	831	372	537	4512
Macoupin	28936	1234	468	54	116	70	148	2089
Kane	27802	1328	589	35	207	1022	321	3503
Grundy	26790	1713	661	283	312	101	165	3235
Kendall	26658	998	313	177	124	80	143	1835
Schuyler	26534	2091	1221	113	8776	110	643	12954
Peoria	25444	2055	952	64	492	437	569	4569
Piatt	25379	2032	764	706	255	40	178	3976
Madison	25285	1345	597	268	298	67	269	2844
Putnam	25191	1955	741	491	198	48	189	3622
Will	25038	1184	473	39	207	151	103	2157
Boone	25002	1373	539	237	181	136	99	2564
Winnebago	24935	1715	647	49	347	498	226	3481
RockIsland	24911	2253	899	60	392	556	2355	6515

Monroe	24840	1789	601	282	302	230	119	3323
Stephenson	24747	1993	729	264	357	97	163	3602
Tazewell	24377	1757	704	103	281	127	146	3118
Marion	24367	2075	828	124	542	285	204	4058
Avg.	**27170**	**1655**	**690**	**171**	**729**	**250**	**428**	**3924**
Bottom quintile								
Warren	19047	2024	882	843	505	46	201	4500
Perry	18889	2302	903	156	372	26	126	3885
Randolph	18819	2072	846	162	305	176	183	3744
Jackson	18643	1463	925	76	651	146	443	3704
McLean	18610	2336	1101	180	583	1131	160	5492
Scott	18504	2077	833	652	491	41	216	4310
Union	18361	2173	898	159	737	66	156	4190
Macon	18343	1535	877	303	301	92	183	3292
Franklin	18256	2891	1071	128	555	1845	248	6736
Shelby	17937	1959	844	712	849	320	209	4893
Hamilton	17831	2308	1127	757	532	286	218	5227
Pike	17660	2269	995	620	637	457	212	5190
Fayette	17242	1952	808	388	453	55	158	3813

Hardin	17219	2288	1156	132	757	65	221	4619
Greene	16760	2277	977	541	529	59	199	4582
Brown	16444	1690	798	677	405	284	232	4086
Pulaski	16330	2483	1424	249	1879	1081	341	7457
Alexander	16094	2521	1283	153	1850	130	218	6155
Pope	15388	2046	906	328	645	555	735	5214
Johnson	14635	2066	749	195	455	43	261	3770
Avg.	**17551**	**2137**	**970**	**371**	**675**	**345**	**246**	**4743**

Table 3. *Multivariate Seemingly Unrelated Regression*

	Total	DR	DO	DX	GG	PC	SW
Model statistics							
R^2	.03	.33	.45	.19	.04	.01	.47
χ^2	51.41**	835.38**	1,413.82**	401.85**	67.48**	14.64*	1,499.00**
Independent variables							
Income	−.08**	−.04**	−.03**	−.03**	ns	ns	.02**
Year	113.77**	30.21**	18.99**	24.92**	23.87**	ns	−8.49**
Population	ns	−.00003*	.00006**	ns	.00008*	ns	−.001**
% Rep votePresident	ns	−3.98**	−6.40**	15.09**	−4.73*	ns	−4.11**
% Rep vote_Senate	−34.02**	−2.09*	ns	3.00**	ns	−29.29*	−2.78**
Federal civilian jobs	-	-	-	-	-	-	.10**
Military jobs	-	-	-	-	-	-	.02**

Notes: N = 1,734. ** < .01, * < .05, ns = not significant.

Figure 1. *Total Federal Expenditure for Top and Bottom Income Quintiles over Time*

Figure 2. *Direct Payments to Individuals (DR and DO) for Top and Bottom Income Quintiles over Time*

Figure 2. *Direct Payments to Individuals (DR and DO) for Top and Bottom Income Quintiles over Time*

Figure 3. *Direct Payments other than to Individuals (DX) and Grants (GG) for Top and Bottom Income Quintiles over Time*

Figure 3. *Direct Payments other than to Individuals (DX) and Grants (GG) for Top and Bottom Income Quintiles over Time*

GG Spending

Figure 4. *Procurement Contracts (PC) and Salaries and Wages (SW) for Top and Bottom Income Quintiles over Time*

Figure 4. *Procurement Contracts (PC) and Salaries and Wages (SW) for Top and Bottom Income Quintiles over Time*

SW Spending

Figure 5: *Program Spending as a Percentage of Total Spending OverTime*

Top Quintile

Figure 5: *Program Spending as a Percentage of Total Spending OverTime*

Bottom Quintile

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